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COUNTER-ADVERTISING IN THE BROADCAST MEDIA:
BRINGING THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS TO BEAR
UPON A THEORETICAL IMPERATIVE
Tom A. COLLINS*
As part of its campaign against unfair advertising, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) in January 1972 submitted to the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) a comprehensive proposal advocating
application through administrative rulemaking of the FCC's fairness
doctrine to a wide spectrum of broadcast advertisements.1 The FCC
and the courts previously had invoked the fairness doctrine as the basis
for implementing counter-advertising to correct false or misleading
statements in broadcast advertising. Taking the position, however, that
counter-advertising should be severely restricted, the FCC has deter-
mined applicability of the fairness doctrine on a case-by-case basis.
A consideration of the FTC proposal, which has evoked vigorous
criticism,2 provides a focal point for discussion and evaluation of the
place of counter-advertising in the broadcast media. Initially, attention
must be directed to the need for adopting new means of protecting the
public interest in full and accurate disclosure in advertising claims. Be-
yond the economic and legal theory justifying its implementation, the
suggestion for increased counter-advertising raises important questions
concerning the effective employment of the administrative process to
foster the beckoning objectives of counter-advertising while minimiz-
ing its adverse impacts, particularly that upon the broadcast industry.
Admittedly, politics enter into the matter; politics are at the center of
all major American social and economic questions.' It is submitted,
nevertheless, that politics, any more than business, need not be a dirty
word, and that an understanding by public administrators,4 as well as
*A.B., Indiana University; J.D., Indiana University, Indianapolis; LL.M, University of
Michigan. Associate Professor of Law, The College of William and Mary.
1. Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, F.C.C. Docket No. 19260, in AN=rTimsr
L. & EcoN. REv., Fall 1971, at 46 [hereinafter cited as FTC Proposal].
2. Loevinger, The Politics of Advertising, 15 Wm. & MARY L. Rav. 1 (1973).
3. See notes 206-23 infra & accompanying text.
4. Professor Davis has described the role of the administrative agency as follows: "The
administrative process is a govermental tool. It is no more conservative or liberal than
the elevator in the Senate Office Building. It is used to promote pro-business policies,
anti-business policies, and policies having little or nothing to do with business." K. DAvis,
ADMtNzsmATIVE LAW 14 (1965).
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by businessmen, of their relation with and obligation to the public in-
terest can only result in increased benefits for all.
THE POSITIVE IMPACT OF COUNTER-ADVERTISING UPON THE
ECONOMIC SYSTEM AND WITHIN THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY
The explicit goal of counter-advertising and other proposals to regu-
late advertising is to provide full and accurate information to the pub-
lic. The theoretical foundation for the private, free enterprise system
includes an axiomatic assumption that all purchasers of products will
have full information about the economy generally and any product
specifically.5 Although, accepting the fact of human limitations," it is
immediately apparent that this objective of perfect knowledge can be
attained only to an imperfect extent; enjoyment of the benefits of a
competitive economy requires persistent aspiration to the goal of an
informed public.
The FTC counter-advertising proposal attempts to achieve this goal
by forcing advertisers to disclose all relevant information in advertising
claims concerning their products. Suggesting that application of the
fairness doctrine to certain advertisements would be consistent with the
public service obligations of both agencies, the proposal seeks to have
the FCC require that broadcasters afford an opportunity for reply to
certain types of advertising. Under the proposal, the fairness doctrine
would be triggered whenever controversial issues of current national
importance are raised either explicitly by advertising asserting claims of
product performance or characteristics 7 or implicitly by advertising
stressing broad recurrent themes affecting the purchase decision." Also
5. R. LiwsEy & P. STrE, EcoNoMIcs 237 (1972).
6. The necessity for and process of adapting economic theory to reality has been
described as follows:
Perfect competition is a perfect procedure with respect to efficiency. Of
course, the requisite conditions are highly specialized ones and they are
seldom if ever fully satisfied in the real world. Moreover, market failures
are often serious, and compensating adjustments must be made by the allo-
cation branch .... Monopolistic restrictions, lack of information ... and
the like must be recognized and corrected .... The ideal conception may
then be used to appraise existing arrangements and as a framework for
identifying the changes that should be undertaken.
J. RAwLs, A THEoaY OF Jusrica 42 (1972).
7. Cited by the FTC as an example of "[a]dvertising asserting claims of product
performance or characteristics that explicitly raise controversial issues of current public
importance" were advertisements stating that the products contribute to the solution of
environmental problems. FTC Proposal, in ANrrnaus-r L. & EcON. REV., Fall 1971, at 53.
8. Food commercials which may be viewed as encouraging poor nutritional habits
were suggested as examples of "[aidvertising stressing broad recurrent themes, affecting
[V l. 15:799
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vulnerable would be advertising claims resting on controversial scien-
tific premises,9 as well as advertising which is silent about negative as-
pects of a product." With respect to the problem of allocating broad-
cast time, the FTC has suggested that paid counter-advertisements
should have the same open access enjoyed by paid commercial adver-
tisements. It was further proposed that five minutes of prime time"
each week be set aside without charge to permit discussion of issues
not addressed in paid counter-advertisements. 2
These proposals for advertising regulation suggest the use of legal
and administrative means for moving toward the theoretical ideal of a
private, free enterprise system with its benefits for all segments of so-
ciety. 13 An underlying premise of counter-advertising is that the eco-
nomic system must reward honest advertisers and deter all others.
"Honest" advertisers may be defined as those who either attempt in
good faith to disclose in their advertisements all relevant data concern-
ing their products or avoid advertising which conveys controversial
implications or questionable factual assertions. The specific aim of
counter-advertising should be to encourage the former type of honest
advertiser and to accept the latter as essentially neutral, being neither
harmful nor helpful to the purchaser. The balance of advertisers are
the purchase decision in a manner that implicitly raises controversial issues of current
national importance." Id. at 53-54.
9. The FTC proposal embraces "fa]dvertising claims that rest upon scientific premises
which are currently subject to controversy within the scientific community." A cited
illustration was a drug advertised as effective in curing or preventing an ailment.
Although this claim may be based upon substantial scientific proof, that proof may be
disputed by other members of the scientific community. The difference of opinion
should be aired in order that the public may make its purchasing decision in full
knowledge of the difference of opinion. Id. at 54-55.
10. Cited as examples of "[aidvertising that is silent about negative aspects of the
advertised product" were advertisements of small cars emphasizing low cost and
economy but omitting safety comparisons with larger cars. Id. at 55-56.
11. Cf. Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971). It is anticipated
that such time periods will expand as counter-advertising is recognized as compatible
with the essential aspects of the existing broadcast structure. If, on the other hand, the
proposal is unsuccessful, the time might decrease. This Article assumes that a further
expansion of counter-advertising time and the rules defining it will occur but does not
concede that the amount would be set at 20 percent of advertising time. See Loevinger,
supra note 2, at 8. Exaggerations of the time proposed for counter-advertising and
other distortions of the FTC proposal have existed since its inception. See Wall Street
Journal, Mar. 1, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
12. FTC Proposal, in 5 ANTITRusT L. & EcoN. REv., Fall 1971, at 57.
13. The theory is that the private, free enterprise system will benefit all, not just
business. See A. Smrm, TE WALTH OrF NATIONS. Thus, Adam Smith's classic work
was not entitled "The Wealth of Businessmen."
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"nondisciosing" advertisers, who, while utilizing facts in their adver-
tisements, either omit relevant facts or make questionable assertions.
In other instances, their advertisements present implications of a factual
or controversial nature without the actual assertion of facts. Nondis-
closing advertisers are not labelled dishonest herein, although some un-
doubtedly are.14 Instead, many advertisers of this type are recognized
as either in philosophical disagreement with the counter-advertising
principle of a fully informed public or unaware of the importance of
such a principle to the economic system and to the reputation of busi-
ness.
Regardless of whether the importance of full disclosure is ever un-
derstood by the advertising industry, subjecting nondisclosing adver-
tisers to counter-advertising will generate several positive results in the
economic system. Most immediately, purchasers will receive more rele-
vant data with which to make more rational purchasing decisions. As a
consequence, products which are most efficient in satisfying consumer
wants will prevail in the marketplace. Significantly, market adjustments
will be achieved not by governmentally controlled decisions but rather
through private responses. Moreover, by utilizing legal coercion 5 to
encourage self-regulation by advertisers, the objectives of counter-ad-
vertising can be realized at minimal cost to the broadcast industry."'
It is to be expected that, after initial applications of counter-advertising
in heavy doses, nondisclosing advertisers will acte7 to avoid being sub-
ject to the adverse marketing impact and additional costs 1 presumably
resulting from presentation of their products in an unfavorable light.
Moreover, supporting the expectation that the objectives of counter-
advertising can be achieved in the short term is the FTC's recently
14. The counter-advertising proposal is not intended as a remedy for dishonest
advertising. Other sanctions, such as preliminary injunctions, are more appropriate in
dealing with such practices. See notes 150-51 infra & accompanying text.
15. Coercion inheres in any legal system. "A legal system is a coercive order of
public rules addressed to rational persons for the purpose of regulating their conduct
and providing the framework for social cooperation." J. RAwLs, supra note 6, at 235.
16. See notes 166-86 infra & accompanying text.
17. See notes 176, 204-05 infra & accompanying text.
18. But cf. Comment, And Now a Word Against Our Sponsor: Extending the FCC's
Fairness Doctrine to Advertising, 60 CAu.n. L. REv. 1416, 1446 n.172 (1972), in which
it is concluded that cigarette advertising was, at most, stunted by the decision in
Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
The amount expended for such advertising fell from over $216 million in 1967 to over
$195 million in 1970, the last year before the ban (15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970)) on such
advertisements went into effect. 60 CAria. L. REv. at 1446 n.172. The 1970 expenditures,
however, exceeded the 1966 amount by over $1 million. Id.
Vol. 15:799
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gained authority to seek preliminary injunctive relief against unfair
advertising.19 By employing its powers, the FTC can discourage unfair
advertising of any type and thus diminish the necessity of invoking
counter-advertising as a remedy.
Beyond the positive impact counter-advertising would have in terms
of efficiency of the economic system, adoption of the FTC proposal
would provide the framework for greater candor by business and an
opportunity to improve its current poor public reputation. Although
some leaders in the business community have attributed the low esteem
in which business is held by many Americans to the sincere but mis-
guided efforts of public interest groups, 20 the President of the United
States Chamber of Commerce has praised Ralph Nader for attempting
to restore basic ideals in the business community.21 Whatever the mer-
its of the attempts by consumer groups to increase public awareness,
it is little wonder that cynicism is directed at a business community
which has opposed the mass of modem social legislation designed to
regulate its activities, even though "these very laws created an environ-
ment in which business has thrived and enjoyed unprecedented pros-
perity and vitality."2 2 Business has helped create its image problem by
aligning itself on the wrong side of too many issues; rather than en-
deavoring to correct deficiencies resulting from a complex set of mul-
tiple interrelationships, business has fought the overwhelming majority
of efforts at reform.2
These public relations difficulties have been exacerbated by the re-
liance of the business community upon advertising as a means of im-
proving its image. Such efforts are often counterproductive, since the
general public disdain for and distrust of advertising naturally passes
to the advertisers.' Dean Prosser's description of "puffing" illuminates
19. 15 U.S.C.A. § 53(b) (Supp. 1974), amending 15 U.S.C. § 53 (1970). See note 151
infra.
20. See Loevinger, supra note 2, at 1 passir.
21. IVal Street Journal, Sept. 19, 1973, at 19, col. 3. Other leaders subsequently
disputed this view.
22. Barmash, Business "Is Own Worst Enemy to Public," May Chairman Says, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 8, 1974, at 45, col. 5. See also Barmash, Retailer's Critical Speech Stirs Big
Mail Response, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1974, at 45, col. 3.
23. Barmash, Business "Is Own Worst Enemy to Public," May Chairman Says, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 8, 1974, at 45, col. 5.
24. Cigarette advertising provides one example from the spectrum of commercial
advertising. Smoking cigarettes may not cause lung cancer, heart disease, and other
disorders; nonetheless, a massive body of reputable scientific opinion has long supported
the conclusion that it does. For many years the industry avoided any mention of the
health danger in its advertising, and the media which accepted the advertising pro-
1974]
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the probem: "The 'puffing' rule amounts to a seller's privilege to lie
his head off, so long as he says nothing specific, on the theory that no
reasonable man would believe him, or that no reasonable man would
be influenced by such talk."2 Thus, while the puffing seller may avoid
tort liability, he should not expect that his practices will engender
warm public approbation.
The attention focused upon the credibility of broadcast advertisers
is heightened by the importance of the electronic media as a means of
disseminating information to the public. Although there are some al-
ternative sources of information concerning products,26 several factors
negate the value of these sources and emphasize that of broadcast ad-
vertising. Public opinion surveys demonstrate that television offers the
most believable of all advertising forums and that such advertising at-
tracts the most consumer attention 7 Furthermore, while television has
a high appeal to upper socio-economic groups,28 it has an especially
great impact upon those at the lower end of the socio-economic spec-
trum, since such individuals generally cannot be reached through the
printed media29
As a result, television can be the most beneficial source of informa-
tion aiding rational purchasing decisions, or, by retarding rational de-
cisionmaking, it can be highly pernicious. Adding to the pernicious pos-
sibilities is the unavailability to most consumers of information counter-
acting the misleading aspects of what they regard as the most credible
source of product information. For consumers acting alone, the cost
of analyzing every product to determine unfavorable aspects and of
disseminating such information would be prohibitive.80 In contrast,
counter-advertising would provide a means by which consumers could
pool their resources and present information concerning products in
vided no effective way to present the public with this information. The position of the
tobacco industry and, to a lesser extent, that of the media is understandable, since both
want a profit and believe their critics wrong. Nevertheless, when a vast array of in-
formed investigators has concluded that a product will lead to agonizing death, one
necessarily questions the motives of those who would sell the product without provid-
ing that information. See generally Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
25. W. PROSSER, TORTS 723 (4th ed. 1971).
26. See Loevinger, supra note 2, at 13-14.
27. R. NoLL, M. Pcic & J. McGowAN, EcoNomic AspEcrs OF TtuvisioN REGULATION
14, 40 (1973) [hereinafter cited as EcoNomic AssEcrs].
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. R. PosNI&R, REGULATION OF ADVERTISING BY ThE FTC 4, 8-9 (1973); Stigler, The
Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. EcoN. 213 (1961).
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the most effective manner. Furthermore, as advertisers discover the de-
sirability of avoiding counter-advertising attacks and embark upon a
course of full disclosure, or at least one of avoiding obfuscation by
nondisclosure, the need for, and cost of, responsive measures would
soon diminish.
America is gripped by a malaise, at the heart of which is the loss
of credibility of its institutions. Indeed, the need for candor is the cen-
tral point of the Watergate dilemma. 31 In times such as these, however,
the cries for honesty in government should not be permitted to drown
out the equally justified pleas for honesty in business.3 2 The govern-
ment alone has not caused an amazing number of people to regard the
energy crisis as a conspiracy between the oil companies and the gov-
ernment; the conduct of the oil companies and the remainder of the
business community has had a major impact upon public opinion.33
The business community can gain the confidence of the American
public only by seeking ways to avoid repetitions of such histories. The
most effective means of achieving a good reputation is to tell the full,
unqualified truth. Support by businessmen of counter-advertising
would be a step in the right direction.
THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE: THEoRETCAL. BASIS FOR
COUNTER-ADVERTISING
Elucidating the public interest criteria of the Federal Communica-
tions Act,34 the fairness doctrine provides the basis for the authority of
the FCC to ensure that the public is not misled by one-sided broadcast
advertising.35 Although the doctrine has a complex history, may be
inconsistent in actual application, and lacks a resolved definition, it is
an inherent and unavoidable part of broadcast regulation. 6 Indeed, it
31. See Loevinger, supra note 2, at 29 n.39. Justice Loevinger argues that "any be-
liever in democracy" must reject counter-advertising because it would increase gov-
ernmental power. Merely preventing such an increase is not even remotely the lesson of
,vWatergate. Rather, governmental power must be contained by the rule of law,
preferably through full disclosure. As this Article will demonstrate, the counter-ad-
vertising proposal would protect by a rule of law the interests of weaker parties,
that is, uninformed consumers, from stronger ones, that is, nondisclosing advertisers.
32. See NEwsavw_, Dec. 10, 1973, at 40 (in public opinion survey, business and Con-
gress each received a rating for candor under 30 percent; that for the executive branch
was less than 20 percent).
33. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1974, § C, at 27, col. 1-3.
34. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1970).
35. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
36. The Supreme Court has observed:
In 1959 the Congress amended the statutory requirement of § 315 that
19741
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now seems clear that the only alternative to application of the fairness
doctrine to advertising would be its total repeal by the FCC. While
undoubtedly pleasing to broadcasters, such an action would be of ques-
tionable legality.87
It is the scope of application of the fairness doctrine to broadcast ad-
vertising which is at the heart of the FTC proposal. This determination
can, of course, be made through administrative adjudication and ju-
dicial decision. 8 Nevertheless, administrative rulemaking which recog-
nizes the nature of the public interest in all its complexities and balances
the needs of the broadcast industry and the viewer would appear a far
more attractive means of resolving the extent to which advertisers are
subject to the fairness doctrine.39 Before examining the rationale for
administrative authority and its reasonable limits, however, it is neces-
sary to survey the history of the fairness doctrine and its application to
advertising.
Developmnt of the Fairness Doctrine through the
Cigarette Controversy
Several early cases concerning control of program content under the
public interest criterion illustrate the development of the fairness doc-
equal time be accorded each political candidate to except certain appear-
ances on news programs, but added that this constituted no exception
"from the obligation imposed upon them under this Act to operate in
the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion
of conflicting views on issues of public importance." Act of September
14, 1959, § 1, 73 Stat. 557, amending 47 U.S.C. § 315 (a) (emphasis added).
This language makes it very plain that Congress, in 1959, announced that
the phrase "public interest," which had been in the Act since 1927, imposed
a duty on broadcasters to discuss both sides of controversial public issues.
In other words, the amendment vindicated the FCC's general view that
the fairness doctrine inhered in the public interest standard.
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969).
37. In light of the 1959 amendments to section 315 of the Communications Act,
47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970) (see notes 36 supra & 47 infra), an attempted administrative
repeal of the fairness doctrine would flout the enunciated legislative policy. Congress
could repeal the relevant language of section 315, but such action is extremely unlikely.
38. The FCC cannot preclude judicial action in the absence of administrative
regulations. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d
543 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
39. Admittedly, FCC regulations would require elaboration in adjudicatory proceed-
ings, as well as subsequent revision. Nevertheless, a comprehensive program would
require minimal elaboration and revision as contrasted with a policy which must
develop on a case-by-case basis.
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trine, as well as its application to advertising. Although developing un-
steadily, the principle of balanced presentations has remained a con-
tinuing thread throughout the history of broadcasting. More than 20
years before the clear genesis of the fairness doctrine in the FCC's 1949
Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees,4 the Federal Radio
Commission (FRC) asserted the importance of balanced program con-
tent in Great Lakes Broadcasting Ca.41 Shortly thereafter the Court -of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld4 a ruling of the
FRC in which the Commission, focusing upon a licensee's false adver-
tising practices in its use of its station solely as an adjunct to its other
business activities, found such purely commercial use improper. The
same court also affirmed the FRC's refusal of a license to a church
which proposed to use a radio station for the exclusive purpose of pro-
moting its denomination; 43 it was held that a licensee, to serve the pub-
lic interest, must present diverse views and not merely those reflecting
its ideas. Although not bearing directly on the current controversy
concerning application of the fairness doctrine to advertising, these
early decisions demonstrate an historic concern with advertising as well
as balance in program presentations.
Between 1943 and 1949 the FCC directed most of its resources to
solving the problems of licensee involvement in political campaigns.4
During this period, nevertheless, the Commission faced squarely for the
first time the question whether members of the public should be af-
forded the opportunity to challenge broadcast advertisements. In Sam
Morris4" residents of localities which prohibited the sale of alcoholic
beverages protested the advertising of such products on a station serv-
ing their area. Framing its decision in terms of the public interest, the
FCC clearly indicated that such advertisements were open to chal-
40. 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). The fairness doctrine has evoked a massive literature. See,
e.g., Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairness and
Access, 85 HARv. L. REv. 768 (1972) (general problem); Putz, Fairness and Commercial
Advertising: A Review and A Proposal, 6 U. SAN FRAx. L. REv. 215 (1972).
41. 3 F.R.C. 32 (1929), rev'd on other grounds sub nona. Great Lakes Broadcasting
Co. v. FRC, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 706 (1930). The Supreme
Court has termed this case the historical antecedent of the fairness doctrine. Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377-78 (1969).
42. KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. FRC, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
43. Trinity Methodist Church, South v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert.
denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933).
44. This effort culminated in the Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees,
13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
45. 11 F.C.C. 197 (1946).
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lenge because the matter was one of controversy and public import-
ance.
40
While not fully inert, the fairness doctrine had limited application
for almost two decades after the 1949 statement on editorials. Indeed,
the most significant occurrence in this interval was the implicit con-
gressional approval of the doctrine in the 1959 amendment to section
315 of the Communications Act.47 The development of the fairness
doctrine in the area of broadcast advertising lay dormant until the
FCC decision in WCBS-TV, Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine to
Cigarette Advertising.1 The FCC ruled that the doctrine attached to
cigarette advertisements, expressly limiting its holding to that product,
however. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
although affirming the FCC decision when the case came before it as
Banzhaf v. FCC,49 placed severe restraints upon the application of the
doctrine to advertising. Observing that the public interest standard ap-
plies primarily to program content, the court reasoned that it could
not uphold the Commission's ruling "merely on the ground that [the
decision] may reasonably be thought to serve the public interest."50
Instead it was deemed necessary to explore fully the reasons for ap-
plying the fairness doctrine to cigarette advertising.
The Commission's position had been based upon the theory that the
46. Id. at 199. The Commission indicated that it would consider a continuation of
present policy at the next license renewal. The matter never achieved visibility again,
perhaps because of the strong stand by the National Association of Broadcasters against
liquor advertising. See Broadcast of Programs Advertising Alcoholic Beverages, 5
P & F RADio REG. 593 (1949).
47. Section 315, as amended, provides, in pertinent part:
Appearance by a legally qualified candidate on any-(1) bona fide news-
cast, (2) bona fide news interview, (3) bona fide news documentary (if
the appearance of the candidate is incidental to the presentation of the
subject or subjects covered by the news documentary), or (4) on the
spot coverage of bona fide news events (including but not limited to
political conventions and activities incidental thereto), shall not be deemed
to be use of a broadcasting station within this subsection. Nothing in the
foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcasters ...from
the obligation imposed upon them under this chapter to operate in the
public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of
conflicting views on issues of public importance.
47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970) (emphasis supplied).
48. 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967), aff'd sub nom. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
49. 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). The court
rejected the appellants request for equal, rather than fair reply, time.
50. Id. at 1096.
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public interest must comprehend protection of the public health.y'
Noting that this rationale has "become a kind of basic law, both justi-
fying new extensions of old powers and invoking the legitimate con-
cern of government wherever its regulatory power otherwise ex-
tends,"52 the court observed that some public health issues are "murky"
and that the FCC has no special expertise to determine which issues
affect the public health.53 Nevertheless, the court rejected the objec-
tions to enforcement of the FCC ruling because of the unique health
hazards associated with cigarettes.54 It was emphasized that the mere
reporting of such hazards would not be an effective challenge to as-
sertions made in the extensive broadcast advertisements of cigarettes.55
Having found that the public interest criterion permits regulation,
the court turned to the first amendment questions"" raised by applica-
tion of the fairness doctrine to broadcast advertising. First, it was ob-
served that the decision of the FCC would not ban the discussion of
smoking and that cigarette commercials would still be permitted.57 Sec-
ond, the court concluded that the speech content of cigarette adver-
tisements "barely" qualifies as constitutionally protected speech, 8 de-
spite a possible chilling effect. 9 Furthermore, the court noted with ap-
proval the observation by the FCC that a full discussion about contro-
versial questions of public importance contributes to the public debate.
51. Sce WSBC, Inc., 2 F.C.C. 455 (1936); Oak Leaves Broadcasting, 2 F.C.C. 298
(1936).
52. 405 F.2d at 1097.
53. Id.
54. The court noted that the grave dangers of cigarette smoking are inherent in the
normal use of the product and threaten the lives of a substantial portion of the popula-
tion. Moreover, the dangers had been established by a "compelling cumulation of
statistical evidence," the Commission having relied upon the conclusions of the Surgeon
General's advisory committee. Id. at 1097-98.
55. The court observed: "[A]s a public health measure addressed to a unique danger
authenticated by official and congressional action, the cigarette ruling is not invalid
on account of its unusual particularity. It is in fact the product singled out for treat-
ment which justifies the action taken." Id. at 1099.
56. id. Compare Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396-97 (1969),
with Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 93 S. Ct. 2080 (1973).
57. 405 F.2d at 1099, 1100.
58. Id. at 1101. The court noted that promotional advertising generally is not within
the ambit of first amendment protection since such advertising does not affect the
political process, contribute to the exchange of ideas, or provide information on matters
of public importance. Rather, since it provides a form of individual expression only
for the advertiser, the promotion of product sales is a form of merchandising subject
to limitation for public purposes, like other business practices. Id. at 1101-02.
59. Id. Presumably, being forced to accept free anti-smoking advertisements would
deter licensee acceptance of advertisements promoting cigarettes.
1974]
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Recognizing that the free speech argument of the cigarette and network
interests would ensure for the wealthy the loudest and most extensive
voice in the marketplace of ideas, the court reasoned that to accept the
argument of those interests would provide them a distinct advantage in
guiding the debate without regard to the truth or the innate popular
appeal of the argument. Consequently, in language foreshadowing that
used by the Supreme Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCCO the
court of appeals found that the FCC ruling actually furthered free
speech.el
Application of the Fairness Doctrine to Controversial Issues Raised by
Commercial Advertising
Although the narrowly circumscribed Banzhaf decision left many im-
portant questions unanswered, it provided the basis for the decision in
Friends of the Earth v. FCC6 2 applying the fairness doctrine to automo-
bile and gasoline advertising. The FCC had rejected the request for
counter-advertising, 3 but the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit held that "when there is undisputable evidence as there is
here, that the hazards to health implicit in air pollution are enlarged and
aggravated by such products, then the parallel of cigarette advertising is
exact."" Noting that the Banzhaf ruling had not had a detrimental effect
on the electronic media, the court rejected the unsupported position of
the FCC that mandatory reply to commercials involving controversial
issues of public importance would disrupt the broadcasting system."5
60. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
61. The court observed:
[Niot only does the cigarette ruling not repress any information, it serves
affirmatively to provide information. We do not doubt that official pre-
scription in detail or in quantity of what the press must say can be as
offensive to the principle of a free press as official prohibition. But the
cigarette ruling does not dictate specific content and, in view of its special
context, it is not a precedent for converting broadcasting into a mouthpiece
for government propaganda. And the provision of information is no small
part of what the First Amendment is about. A political system which
assigns vital decisions to individual free choice assumes a well-informed
citizenry. We do not think the principle of free speech stands as a barrier
to required broadcasting of facts and information vital to an informed
decision to smoke or not to smoke.
405 F.2d at 1103.
62. 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
63. 24 F.C.C2d 743 (1970).
64. 449 F.2d at 1169.
65. Id. at 1168.
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The public controversy concerning pollution remains in 1974 and,
indeed, has been intensified by the energy crisis; the FCC, nevertheless,
has retained the position it asserted in Friends of the Earth that pro-
gramming on the pollution issue is subject to the program'balance re-
quirements of the fairness doctrine but advertising implicitly raising that
issue is not." An examination of the FCC position illuminates many of
the tenuous and fallacious arguments currently being urged against
adoption of the FTC counter-advertising proposal.
The FCC argued in Friends of the Earth that, because balancing the
benefits and detriments of polluting products involves more complex
issues than the cigarette controversy, the rationale for requiring reply
spot advertisements to counteract cigarette advertising should be inap-
plicable to the pollution issue.0 7 Although there is merit to the argument
that complex issues should not be discussed in the psychologically ap-
pealing format of spot advertising, the conclusion of the Commission
against permitting such spot counter-advertisements is untenable so
long as spot advertisements urging consumption of products emitting
pollutants remain permissible. Moreover, just as the news and editorial
coverage of the cigarette health hazard faced oblivion in the onslaught
of massive cigarette advertising,"" the interaction of news and other cov-
erage of the pollution problem will be of limited effect as long as pol-
luters advertise massively and those seeking to end pollution cannot.
Thus, an argument can be made against all spot announcements
concerning controversial issues 9 but not against permitting reply to
those presenting only one side of an issue.
Counter-advertising is needed to inform the public of the dangers
inherent in polluting products and would not, as the FCC implied in
Frieuds of the Earth,70 discourage technological innovation aimed at
improving the quality of life. The issue which must be resolved is not
the use or non-use of polluting products; instead, the focus of the con-
troversy is upon advertising which conceals the fact that some of the
fruit of the technological revolution, if not altogether poisonous, may
be so tainted as to threaten the quality of life.71 Granting the propriety
66. 24 F.C.C.2d at 750.
67. Id. at 746.
68. See Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
842 (1969).
69. A total ban of controversial spot advertisements probably would be financially
disastrous to the broadcast industry. Moreover, such an action would fail to aid in
providing consumers the information with which to make rational purchasing choices.
70. 24 F.C.C.2d at 746.
71. 449 F.2d at 1169.
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of promoting the use of technological developments, the target of the
FTC proposal is promotion which obfuscates or fails altogether to pre-
sent information concerning deleterious effects of products. Such in-
adequate advertising inhibits the public's access to essential considera-
tions and thereby violates the public interest criterion of the Communi-
cations Act.72
Rather than supporting counter-advertising, the FCC suggested in
FrienTds of the Earth that advertising is peripheral to solving the pollu-
tion problem.73 It is submitted, however, that the policy decision of re-
quiring counter-advertising, or of prohibiting advertising rather than
banning a product, applies equally to cigarettes and pollutants. The
presentation of complete information promotes the freedom of con-
sumers to use products which harm only the user or which fulfill a
substantial need of society or a largesegment of it. Since cigarettes af-
ford many people pleasure or fulfill a psychological need, consumers
must be permitted to balance the benefits against the potential harm of
cigarette smoking and thus reach their own conclusions. The balancing
process requires advertisers to present the needed information rather
than avoid the issue. Although most common polluting products harm
persons other than the user, many fulfill great societal needs and indi-
vidual desires. Consequently society and individuals need complete in-
formation to determine permissible total use and appropriate individual
use of such products. The recognition that some utilization of pollut-
ing products is essential to American civilization does not support un-
bridled advertising which urges the overuse 4 and misuse of products
to achieve a "full rich life" and which ignores the undesirable conse-
quences.75 By requiring disclosure of controversial and undesirable ef-
fects, a system of counter-advertising would balance satisfactorily the
interests of society and the business community.76
The asserted peripheral effect of advertising was not the foundation
of the FCC ruling in Friends of the Eartb; rather, that basis was the
Commission's fear that requiring counter-advertising responses would
72. Id. at 1169-71.
73. 24 F.C.C.2d at 746.
74. If a product is generally desired or actually needed by large numbers of people,
consumers will purchase a sufficient amount of the product to fulfill that desire or
need in the absence of advertising exaggerating the product's benefits.
75. 449 F.2d at 1169.
76. Admittedly, neither counter-advertising nor the total FTC effort to regulate
advertising will solve every advertising problem. Nevertheless, counter-advertising
should remedy many of the deficiencies in current advertising practices.
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undermine the present system of broadcasting. 77 The Commission's ar-
gument that counter-advertising would place an unreasonable financial
burden on the broadcast industry," however, was tacitly rejected in
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,79 where the Supreme Court stated
that if broadcasters sought to avoid any increased costs resulting from
application of the fairness doctrine by curtailing programming cover-
age of a particular controversy, the FCC should be prepared, neverthe-
less, to require coverage.80 It is submitted, moreover, that the entire
financial argument lacks merit; not a scintilla of evidence suggests that
the networks would collapse under the burden of anti-pollution ad-
vertisements.
The FCC again refused to apply the fairness doctrine to advertise-
ments concerning pollution in Alan F. Neckritz,8 ' despite warnings
from the dissent that stronger rules may be forced upon the Commis-
sion by the courts. 2 Complainants argued that advertisements for Chev-
ron with F-3 10 suggested that the gasoline contributed significantly to
cleaner air.83 The majority of the Commission, finding that the adver-
tisement was merely competitive and did not raise the issue of air pol-
lution despite its allusion to cleaning the air, stated: "The Chevron ad-
vertisements do not claim there is no danger in air pollution ... but
assert, instead, that use of the sponsor's product helps to solve the prob-
lem."' 4 It was also observed that the fairness doctrine was not intended
77. 24 F.C.C.2d at 748-49.
78. Id. In assessing the financial impact of counter-advertising, it is instructive to
note that application of the fairness doctrine to cigarette advertising clearly did not
drive such advertising from the air. See Comment, And Now a Word Against Our
Spotsor: Extending the FCC's Fairness Doctrine to Advertising, 60 CALr. L. Rav. 1416,
1446 n.172 (1972), discussed in note 18 supra. Moreover, an inquiry might be made
into the value of saving a system of broadcasting if it is dependent upon advertising
which conceals, glosses, or distorts information which is vital to the health of some
individuals and perhaps to the survival of mankind. See generally EcoNoMic AsPECTs,
supra note 27 (discussing alternatives to the present system).
79. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
80. Id. at 393-94.
81. 29 F.C.C.2d 807 (1971).
82. Id. at 816.
83. Various versions of the advertisement presented a late model Chevrolet with a
large balloon attached which turned black with exhaust, a car engulfed in a bag of
black smoke, and exhaust ignited with a blow torch to indicate unburned gasoline in
the exhaust. These advertisements asserted that the depicted conditions were remedied
by the use of six tankfuls of the gasoline and concluded that "F-310 turns dirty exhaust
into good clean mileage." Id. at 807-08.
84. Id. at 812.
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to apply to advertisements which refer to, but do not discuss, contro-
versial issues.
What the FCC appears to have ignored is that the advertiser used the
issue of air pollution as a means of improving public opinion of its prod-
uct.85 Various federal and state governmental actions regarding the ad-
vertisements attest to their controversial character.86 This and many
other advertisements claiming pollution abatement raise the contro-
versial issue whether the advertised product actually makes a significant
contribution to the public policy of ending pollution. Nevertheless,
while conceding that a blatantly controversial assertion concerning ecol-
ogy would invoke the fairness doctrine,87 the FCC attempted to re-
strict the application of the doctrine in advertising to the "unique"
cigarette.88 The FCC must recognize that such a position is too restric-
five to be supported and that the public interest criterion of the Com-
munications Act requires that it deal with the problems of controversy
and deceit in broadcast advertising.
In an advertising controversy concerning labor relations, the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Retail Store Em-
ployees' Union v. FCC9 instructed the FCC to refine its analysis 0 of
the applicability of the fairness doctrine. The court stated that strikes
and union boycotts are clearly controversial issues of substantial public
importance within the community,91 noting that Congress had enacted
labor legislation dealing with the broad problem of economic warfare
between labor and management as well as the specific problems en-
gendered by union strikes and boycotts.9 2 Although the court found
that there might be circumstances in which a licensee would have to
85. See id. at 817 (dissenting opinion).
86. At the time of the FCC decision in Alan F. Neckritz, the FTC had issued a
complaint against the advertisement. In addition, the California Air Resources Board
and the Hawaiian State Consumer Protection Committee had found the advertisement
to be misleading. Id.
87. 29 F.C.C.2d at 812.
88. Id. at 811.
89.436 F.2d 248 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The controversy arose out of a strike by the
appellant union against an Ashtabula, Ohio, department store within the broadcast
area of radio station WREO. Without mentioning the strike, WREO carried adver-
tisements for the store while also carrying a substantial number of union advertisements
supporting the strike. In April 1966, the station refused further advertisements from
the union concerning the strike, proposing instead a roundtable discussion of the
issue. Neither party accepted the proposal. id. at 250-51.
90. 14 F.C.C.2d 423 (1968).
91. 436 F.2d at 258.
92. Id. at 259.
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grant reply time to a union to answer labor-related assertions in a retail
store's advertising, it did not suggest the factors the FCC should con-
sider in determining when the fairness doctrine is triggered. Neverthe-
less, the suggestion is plain that the FCC position will receive intensive
judicial scrutiny.
Implementation of the FTC counter-advertising proposal clearly
would overrule administratively the FCC decisions in Alan F. Neckritz
and Retail Store Employees' Union. Because the gasoline advertisement
in Alan F. Neckritz affected the purchase decision in a manner which
implicitly raised controversial issues of current national importance13
and made controversial scientific claims,94 it clearly would have invoked
counter-advertising under the second and third criteria of the FTC
proposal. Similarly, the FCC decision in Retail Store Employees' Union
is inconsistent with the second element of the proposal, since the ad-
vertising implicitly raised controversial labor relations issues. 5
Continuing the administrative and judicial effort to define contro-
versial advertising, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in Green v. FCC"0 affirmed the FCC ruling 7 that the fairness
doctrine was inapplicable to military recruiting advertisements on the
ground that the advertising raised no controversial issue of public im-
portance.98 Reasoning that the only issue raised was voluntary recruit-
ment, the court rejected the argument that the draft, the Vietnam war,
the morality of war, and the desirability of military service were im-
plicit issues in the advertisement. 99 The Green decision thus can be
reconciled with Banzbaf and Friends of the Earth upon the basis that
the former did not deal, implicitly or explicitly, with a controversial
subject, whereas Banzbaf clearly concerned a controversial subject"0
and Friends of the Earth contained inherent elements of controversy.
That attempted distinction, however, remains vulnerable. Are not the
93. See note 8 supra & accompanying text.
94. See note 9 supra & accompanying text.
95. See note 8 supra & accompanying text.
96. 447 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
97. David C. Green, 24 F.C.C.2d 175 (1970).
98. 447 F.2d at 329-31.
99. Id. at 330.
100. The Banzhaf decision focused upon the existence of a controversy rather than
upon the implication of one. Nevertheless, the advertisements at issue in that case
either raised the health issue only by implication or were silent about that consideration.
Because the cigarette smoking issue also includes scientific controversy, cigarette ad-
vertising also falls within the third category of the FTC proposal. See note 9 supra.
Most advertising embraced by the proposal meets more than one of the criteria.
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draft and the desirability of military service implicitly involved in ad-
vertising for voluntary recruitment? The answer appears less clear than
the FCC and the court of appeals were willing to admit.1 1
Because the Green court narrowly construed the Banzhaf rule, it
seems clear that it would not have ordered spot reply advertisements
even if the military recruitment advertisements were deemed to be con-
troversial. In Banzhaf it was held that discussion of cigarette smoking
on news or educational programs was an insufficient means of chal-
lenging the claims made in extensive commercial spot advertising.0 2 The
court in Green indicated, however, that the mere fact that one side of
an issue is discussed in advertisements does not mean that a necessary
balance must be struck through reply advertisements presenting an op-
posing point of view.103
The decision in Green also overlooks a serious candor problem in the
military recruitment advertising. Extremely laudatory of the military,
the advertisements failed to present the arduous, dangerous aspect of
military service. Indeed, a striking parallel exists between the "you'll
get more out of life" advertisements for cigarettes and the military re-
cruitment effort. Advertising which distorts the reality of war or mili-
tary service in peacetime creates the same problems as other types of
distorting advertisements. Undoubtedly, nearly everyone knows the
reality of military service; indeed, this widespread knowledge appears
to be the basis of the court's findings. 04 Nevertheless, advertisements
omitting material facts are improper, whatever the subject matter. In
short, the court erred in finding that an advertisement omitting vital
data represented a suitable access to ideas and experience. 05
The clear purpose of advertising frequently is to overcome rational
101. An examination of the debate on ending the draft suggests the interrelationship
of voluntary recruitment and the draft. Evidencing the connection among all forms
of fulfilling manpower requirements, a major issue is whether an end to the draft will
seriously reduce draft-induced enlistments labelled "voluntary." Such voluntary enlist-
ments are an important alternative to the draft, but the court in Green did not discuss
this interrelationship, instead reasoning simplistically that "one who voluntarily enlists,
which is the object of recruitment announcements, is not a draftee." 447 F.2d at 330.
Those whose enlistments had been induced by the draft might doubt the statement,
despite its literal truth. Such enlistments were motivated in part by a desire to gain
the benefits suggested by the advertisement while avoiding the disadvantages that might
flow from the draft. Indeed, the court's statement might be regarded as substantially
incorrect.
102. 405 F.2d at 1098.
103. 447 F.2d at 333.
104. Id. at 331.
105. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969).
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decisionmaldng, "no matter how fully the seeming subject matter is
covered in the licensee's programming or is patently apparent to the
public,"' ' and thus to induce the results sought by the advertisement.
On issues of controversy, the public interest criterion requires that the
consumer be permitted to make a rational decision. This being so, it
follows that the public interest should also require remedial presenta-
tion of factual data which is detrimental and material, without regard
to the controversial nature of the matter involved in the underlying is-
sue. Addressing the problem of silence in advertising, the fourth cri-
terion of the FTC counter-advertising proposal'0 7 would provide the
opportunity for reply to the advertisements in Green unless the public
interest in maintaining the military were found to outweigh the harm
of the omission.108
The foregoing review of opinions concerning the application of the
fairness doctrine to advertising indicates that the FCC and the courts
can resolve marginal factual problems realistically and thereby move
toward the goal of more specific, inclusive standards. Nevertheless, it
is submitted that a preferable means of clarifying the limits of the fair-
ness doctrine and the public interest criteria would be to implement the
comprehensive FTC counter-advertising proposal.109 An analysis of the
controversies to which the fairness doctrine has been applied indicates
106. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
842 (1969).
107. See note 10 supra & accompanying text.
108. 447 F.2d at 329.
109. Without administrative clarification, continued litigation is almost certain. Since
the fairness doctrine is legislatively sanctioned (see notes 36-37 & 47 supra), the FCC
must enforce it or the judiciary will. The courts are unlikely to overrule Banzhaf and
Friends of the Earth; furthermore, congressional repeal of the doctrine appears equally
improbable. Thus, a comprehensive definition of the doctrine by the FCC is desirable
to further justice and administrative and judicial efficiency.
A clarification of the fairness doctrine also will assist pleading and proof in subsequent
litigation. Presently, after a complainant establishes a prima facie case, the burden of
proof shifts to the respondent. Office of Communications of United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 425 F.2d 543, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In Hale v. FCC, 425 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir.
1970), the court stated that to establish a violation of the fairness doctrine, complainants
must show that specific programs have dealt with controversial issues partially, and, if
so, that other programs on the station have not balanced the coverage by presenting
opposing viewpoints. Acknowledging that the doctrine looks to the general balance
of a station's programming, the court stated, as follows, that proof of a violation must be
based on specific facts:
Where complaint is made to the Commission, the Commissioner expects a
complainant to submit specific information indicating (1) the particular
station involved; (2) the particular issue of a controversial nature discussed
over the air; (3) the date and time when the program was carried; (4) the
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that the first"10 and second"' categories of the proposal are generally
within, and the third"12 and fourth"' categories are easily derived from,
the doctrine as presently enunciated. Only rarely will advertisements
for a product fall within either of the first two categories without in-
volving the third or fourth as well. Retail Store Employees' Union and
Green exemplify the rare advertisement which fits within only one
category under the proposal. Promoting cigarettes as part of the good
life, the Banzbaf advertisements implicitly raised a continuing health
controversy, involved a scientific dispute, and failed to disclose a nega-
tive aspect, thereby coming within categories two, three, and four.
Arguably, the advertisements in Friends of the Earth and Alan F.
Neckritz involved both implicit and scientific controversies.
It is perhaps unfortunate that everyday products involve inherent
policy problems. In an interacting society which is both a biological
and social ecosphere, however, the actions of every person, including
his use of products, affect other citizens and the public interest. Con-
sequently, the connection between products and controversial issues is
clear and unavoidable.
COUNTER-ADVERTISING AND THE FrsT AMENDMENT
Any discussion of the economic and social justification for counter-
advertising requires a consideration of whether application of the fair-
ness doctrine to advertising is consistent with first amendment guaran-
tees. Decisions of the Supreme Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
basis for the claim that the station has presented only one side of the
question; and (5) whether the station had afforded, or has plans to afford,
an opportunity for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints.
Id. at 558-59. While perhaps reasonable, the standard suggested in Hale is difficult to
meet, requires an examination of previous programming in considerable detail, and will
deter many parties from initiating litigation. See COLLINS, Positing a Right of Access"
Evaluations and Subsequent Developments, 15 Wm. & MARY L. Rxv. 339, 349-50 (1973).
Only determined individuals desiring meaningful dialogue, rather than loud militants
seeking diatribe, will be able to meet the Hale standard.
110. See note 7 supra & accompanying text. See also Retail Store Employees' Union v.
FCC, 436 F.2d 248, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Alan F. Neckritz, 29 F.C.C.2d 907 (1971)
(dictum).
111. See note 8 supra & accompanying text. See also Friends of the Earth v. FCC,
449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
112. See note 9 supra & accompanying text.
113. See note 10 supra & accompanying text.
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FCC"4 and Pittsburgb Press Co. v. Comnission on Human Relations" 5
together rebut any constitutional arguments against the FTC proposal.
Product advertising is the prime example of commercial speech, which
was specifically held in Pittsburgb Press to be outside the ambit of first
amendment protections."" There is thus no constitutional impediment
to applying the fairness doctrine, held constitutional in Red Lion, to
require broadcast licensees to ensure the equitable coverage of contro-
versial subjects explicitly or implicitly raised in commercial advertise-
ments.UI
Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee,"8
involving noncommercial advertising, is of no assistance to opponents
of the FTC proposal. Rather than basing their challenge on the fairness
doctrine, the plaintiffs in that case argued that an absolute refusal to
sell time for political advertisements" 9 violated the right of access cre-
ated by the Communications Act and the first amendment.120 The Su-
preme Court rejected this argument on the basis of the legislative his-
tory of the Communications Act,'2' an absence of state action,122 and
the lack of a first amendment right of access.2' Moreover, limiting its
decision to the facts of the case, the Court specifically left open the
possibility for legislation or a Commission rule either forbidding an
absolute refusal by a licensee to accept political advertisements or re-
quiring that any such advertisement be accepted.2
Presented in a portion of Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Demo-
cratic National Committee which received the support of less than a
majority of the Court, the argument that the first amendment requires
"editorial independence" could provide a basis for invalidating an ad-
114. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). For a strong argument against the constitutionality of the
fairness doctrine, see Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on
40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MrN. L. REv. 67 (1967).
115. 413 U.S. 376 (1973). See also Valentine v. Chrestenson, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). The
case law renders unconvincing the argument of interference with first amendment
freedoms urged by Justice Loevinger. Loevinger, supra note 2, at 24-28.
116. For protection to arise under the first amendment, the material at issue must
have idea content. 413 U.S. at 385.
117. See Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842
(1969).
118. 93 S. Ct. 2080 (1973).
119. Id. at 2084-86.
120. Id. at 2084.
121. Id. at 2087-91.
122. Id. at 2092-96.
123. Id. at 2099-2101.
124. Id. at 2094.
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vertising reply regulation'- 5 For invalidation to occur under this
theory, the intrusion of the regulation must be so great that effective
editorial control is shifted from the licensee to the regulator. 2  The
threat to the validity of counter-advertising on this basis appears mini-
mal for two reasons. In the subsequent decision in Pittsburgh Press, no
-other justice joined or advanced the Chief Justice's position concerning
editorial independence.12 Furthermore, the history of the fairness doc-
trine demonstrates that the FCC has given the licensee broad discretion
to exercise its public trusteeship in good faith and that the Commission
acts only when the licensee breaches that trust.'28 Continuing this long-
standing policy, any final set of FCC counter-advertising rules should
both encourage maxium compliance and provide continued monitoring
to assure that the standards do not work an abusive or arbitrary hard-
ship upon the licensee.12 9
As noted previously, the Court in Democratic National Conmnittee
left unresolved the validity of a statutory or administratively created
right of access for ideas. In Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co.,1"0
however, the Florida Supreme Court, following the rationale of the
decision in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. to its logical conclusion, upheld
an ineptly drafted state statute requiring access for reply to political at-
tacks.' 3' The court's enlightened concept of access was based upon the
theory that the first amendment accords greater value to the right to
125. The argument was advanced in Part III of the opinion. Id. at 2092-96. Only
Justices Rehnquist and Stewart joined the Chief Justice on this point.
126. Id. at 2095-96.
127. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
128. Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
129. See note 186 infra & accompanying text.
130. 287 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1973), revd, 42 U.S.L.W. 5098 (U. S. June 25, 1974). A special
concurrence by Justice Roberts of the Florida court distinguished Democratic National
Conrmittee. Id. at 87-89.
131. The statute provides:
If any newspaper in its columns assails the personal character of any
candidate for nomination or for election in any election, or charges said
candidate with malfeasance or misfeasance in office, or otherwise attacks his
official record, or gives to another free space for such purpose, such news-
paper shall upon request of such candidate immediately publish free of
cost any reply he may make thereto in as conspicuous a place and in the
same kind of type as the matter that calls for such reply, provided such
reply does not take up more space than the matter replied to. Any person
or firm failing to comply with the provisions of this section shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082
or § 775.083.
FLA. STAT. Aix. § 104.38 (1973). The statute is vulnerable to attack for vagueness and
overbreadth.
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receive ideas than to the right of the broadcaster or publisher to edi-
torial independence. 132 It is thus clear that the rationale of Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. ultimately supports the consistency between the first
amendment and a counter-advertising regulation. Enforcement of the
fairness doctrine to its fullest functional extent is a necessary and valu-
able ingredient in a broadcasting system which values and protects free
speech. Moreover, the FTC proposal, by providing an excellent format
for presenting the public with information, would assist in the realiza-
tion of the goals of rational decisionmaking and a reputable business
community.
PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES OF IMPLEMENTING
A CoUNTER-ADVERTISING PROPOSALa
A fair evaluation of the counter-advertising proposal must take ac-
count of the practical problems arising from its implementation. An
assessment that the proposal will present significant difficulties suggests
the need to explore positive solutions. Thus, having established the
theoretical justification for counter-advertising, it is now necessary to
examine in some detail the insuperable obstacles which opponents have
asserted would be inherent in application of the FTC proposal.133 These
practical difficulties include the economic impact of counter-advertising
upon the electronic media, its influence on the nature of advertising,
and the involvement of politics in advertising questions. The adminis-
trative character of the FTC proposal avoids the practical problems
which might arise under either a judicially enforced program or a
legislatively enacted counter-advertising format. Moreover, even con-
ceding that practical difficulties exist in implementing the proposal,
most of these problems can be adequately resolved by a proper utiliza-
tion of the administrative process.
The Nature of the Administrative Process
Endowed with flexibility, a properly functioning administrative
process provides the most appropriate governmental avenue for imple-
menting a counter-advertising program. Through a process of experi-
mentation, an administrative agency can respond to new problems rap-
idly.134 This is partially due to the fact that an agency, particularly one
with rulemaking authority, is not as inhibited by stare decisis as the
132. 287 So. 2d at 87.
133. E.g., Loevinger, supra note 2, at 8-21.
134. See K. DAVis, ADMNISmTVE LAW §§ 1.01-.08 (1965, Supp. 1970).
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courts in reversing prior decisions 35 and also because it can act more
quickly than the Congress in formulating innovative and complex pro-
grams. 36 As long as it acts in furtherance of its statutory purpose, an
administrative agency can, when necessary, freely change its policies or
procedures.13 7
Because of these important considerations, it is manifest that the ad-
ministrative process should be used as the means of implementing the
FTC's counter-advertising proposal. The FCC could, for example, re-
quire only the most economically viable stations to run counter-adver-
tisements until it determines the economic impact of the proposal. 38
In addition, the percentage of time initially established as the upper limit
for counter-advertising need not be as great as that which may eventu-
ally result, and the grant of reply time could at first be limited to only
certain of the four categories outlined in the FTC proposal. A gradual
implementation of the concept would protect against abuses and permit
timely termination should serious problems arise.
Although there are other alternative means of achieving the objec-
tives of counter-advertising, none appear as promising as the administra-
tive process. For example, while helpful, voluntary private regulation
has been generally unsuccessful in the past because of its limited effec-
tiveness.'" A judicially created tort or legislatively enacted criminal
statute would lack flexibility, and the latter would be overly punitive.
Another salutary characteristic of the administrative process is the
ability to supplement abstract regulations with hypothetical examples.140
The inclusion of examples is designed to increase public certainty and
135. Id. § 17.09.
136. Id. 5S 1.05, 1.39-40.
137. Cf. id. §§ 17.01-.09.
138. Perhaps network affiliates in the top 50 markets would constitute a group for
the initial application. This was the standard utilized in implementing the FCC's prime
time access rule, 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k) (4) (1973).
139. The newly created National Advertising Review Board appears to be doing
more than any previous effort. Hopefully, the Board would supplement counter-
advertising rules, make suggestions on their clarification and modification, and otherwise
aid in the effort to provide more informative advertisements. However, the fact that
the Board has no legal authority calls into question its long-range effectiveness. Cf.
J. RAWLs, A TBtoRY OF JusTicE (1972), in which it is argued: "It is reasonable to
assume that even in a well-ordered society the coercive powers of government are to
some degree necessary for the stability of social cooperation." Id. at 240.
140. Professor Davis has observed: "An agency which uses three tools for making
law-adjudication, rules in the form of generalizations, and rules in the form of
hypotheticals-is much better equipped to serve the public interest than an agency
which limits itself to the first twvo of the three tools." K. DAvis, DiscaEToNARY JusricE
61 (Illini Books ed. 1973).
[Vol. 15:799
COUNTER-ADVERTISING
to decrease the possibility of arbitrariness on the part of the agency or
a reviewing court."' In a fashion, the FCC has provided examples in
its statements on the fairness doctrine and local service,14 even some in-
volving advertising situations.1 43 In the future, the Commission could
use some of the absurd complaints and diatribe it has received to illus-
trate situations which do not warrant counter-advertising. 14 4 The use of
such examples would assist the FCC in performing its regulatory func-
tion and the broadcasting industry and advertisers in understanding the
duties imposed upon them by counter-advertising regulations.
Although the FTC and the FCC were created by Congress to per-
form different functions, the agencies in some instances have over-
lapping duties and often deal with different facets of the same social
or political problem. With respect to advertising, for example, the FTC
controls the message, and the FCC regulates the broadcasting media.'45
The suggestion that the FTC alone should bear responsibility for ad-
vertising abuses fails to appreciate the interrelationship of the two
agencies. The FTC has the duty and power to regulate advertising and
thereby forbid unfair and deceptive practices. 46 On the other hand, the
the Communications Act gives the FCC the responsibility for regulat-
ing broadcasting in the public interest,147 a power which unquestionably
reaches advertising. Unfair advertising cannot be reconciled with that
standard, even if such advertising is a major source of a licensee's profits.
Recognizing the connection between unfair advertising and the pub-
lic interest criteria, the FCC has held that subliminal advertisements
"clearly are intended to be deceptive" and are inconsistent with the ob-
ligation of a licensee.14 8 Equally improper would be advertisements
141. Id. at 58-61.
142. Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 27 F.C.C.2d 650
(1971); Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues
of Public Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598 (1964).
143. Applicability of Commission Policies on Program-Length Commercials, 29 P & F
RAwio REG. 469 (1974).
144. One example is the assertion that dog food advertisements raise the issue of the
effects of dog-carried pests upon humans. This assertion illustrates a situation which
does not raise an implicit, controversial issue. See Loevinger, supra note 2, at 12-13.
The FCC files contain many more examples, some of which will provide even better
guidance concerning the limits of counter-advertising.
145. Liaison between FCC and FTC Relating to False and Misleading Radio and TV
Advertising, 22 F.C.C. 1572 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Liaison Statement].
146. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
147. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1970).
148. Broadcast of Information by Means of "Subliminal Perception" Techniques, 29
P & F RADio REG. 395, 396 (1974).
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urging the use of aspirins to treat cancer or promoting the sale of nar-
cotics. 149 Both the FTC and FCC must take responsibility for regulating
such advertising by defining their respective areas of authority and,
when necessary, working together to solve common problems.
An important functional distinction between the FTC and FCC may
be used to explain the role of each agency in regulating advertising.
The FCC has the affirmative duty to promote the effective use of broad-
casting in the public interest. The FTC, on the other hand, has the
responsibility of preventing abuse in advertising. Therefore, the FCC's
mandate is to promote good, while that of the FTC is to prevent evil.
In advertising issues, some developments are sufficiently harmful to re-
quire FTC action; the sanguine character of others suggests the desir-
ability of FCC promotion. A great range of developments and situa-
tions, however, neither warrant absolute prohibition nor require appro-
bation. In such situations, the FTC sanctions of cease and desist ord-
ers'5° and preliminary inunctionsirt are reasonably believed to be ex-
cessive. The agency could invoke these sanctions when other measures
are unavailable but would be well advised to avoid them. Nevertheless,
some administrative action is desirable in dealing with that type of ad-
vertising falling within the outer limits of "good" and "evil."
Advertising which provides just enough information about a product
to be misleading exemplifies one such intermediate situation, as do com-
mercials which implicitly raise scientific or other controversial issues.
To further the public interest, both the proponents and opponents of
the assertions made in such advertisements should be able to present
their views so that the issues may be resolved in a civil and democratic
149. The Supreme Court has cited promotion of narcotics as an extreme example of
advertising abuse. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 388 (1973).
150. 15 U.S.C. S 21(b) (1970).
151. A rider to the Alaska pipeline legislation granted the FTC the power to seek
preliminary injunctions when the Commission believes that an unfair trade practice has
occurred. 15 U.S.C.A. § 53(b) (Supp. 1974), anzending 15 U.S.C. § 53 (1970). The
legislative history of the amendments indicates that the determinant of whether an
injunction should be issued is a public interest standard. CoiNr. REP. No. 93-924, 93d
Cong, 1st Sess. (1973).
The authority of the FTC to seek preliminary injunctions should supplement the
Commission's other efforts to regulate advertising. Properly used, this authority will
arrest blatant violations of section five of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.
S 45 (1970). The FTC can employ lesser sanctions against less clear violations or in
situations in which the product has both favorable and unfavorable aspects. For
example, in many situations where an injunetion is not an appropriate remedy, the
advertiser should be given the opportunity to provide additional information concerning
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manner. In this regard, the requirement that advertising present all rele-
vant and controversial aspects of a product provides a more appropriate
resolution than barring advertisements or even the product itself.1 2 Al-
though these t-wo remedies exist, the creation of an administrative
framework which will encourage honest advertising in the first instance
wvill be the best means of assuring that the public will have the informa-
tion needed to make informed decisions concerning products.
In addition to the nature of the statutory mandates of the FCC and
FTC, the development of the law of standing supports the desirability
of promulgation by the FCC of counter-advertising regulations. The
cases now permit members of the public who are injured in fact to
appeal from an agency decision when the interest affected is arguably
within the scope of protection of the relevant statute.153 Unquestion-
ably, consumers are injured in fact by false or incomplete advertising
which causes them to purchase products they otherwise would not buy.
Given this injury and the fact that administrative agencies are inade-
quately funded,' 4 consumers perform a much needed function by be-
coming private attorneys general who vindicate the public interest.
The role of the consumer varies considerably, however, in actions be-
gun by the FTC and the FCC. The nature of FTC remedies and the
FTC control of initiating actions largely preclude consumer involve-
ment in the matters at issue before that agency. 5 Conversely, the Com-
munications Act requirement that licenses be granted in the public in-
its product. As Justice Brandeis observed: 'If there be time to expose through discus-
sion the falsehood and fallacies, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced
silence." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (concurring opinion).
152. 15 U.S.C. § 2057 (Supp. 11 1972) (authority of Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission to ban hazardous products).
153. E.g., Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc., v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
154. See Loevinger, supra note 2, at 7. At one point, the author suggests that the
FTC should seek additional funds which would enable that agency to enforce counter-
advertising itself. Id. In apparent contradiction, he later criticizes the FTC for seeking
additional funds by circumventing the Office of Management and Budget and going
directly to Congress. Id. at 19. The Supreme Court has provided general support
for the FTC's effort to obtain extra funds from Congress, noting: "The Federal Trade
Commission is an administrative body created by Congress to carry into effect legislative
policies embodied in statute... and to perform other specified duties as a legislative or
judicial aid .... Its duties are performed without executive leave and ...must be
free from executive control." Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628
(1935).
155. The Federal Trade Commission Act permits any person to intervene in an action
but not to initiate one. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970).
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terest 156 has resulted in an FCC format which encourages public partici-
pation in that agency's licensing and rulemaking proceedings.157
The FTC and the FCC have a long-standing policy of cooperating
to solve problems concerning broadcast advertising.' 58 Coordination of
the two agencies' efforts is only logical in light of the massive adver-
tising expertise of the FTC and the knowledge and experience the FCC
has acquired in regulating broadcasting. Obviously, the FCC should
employ its expertise to rectify deceptive and incomplete broadcast ad-
vertising. Any regulatory problems growing out of the overlapping
jurisdictions 'of the FTC and FCC should be resolved by inter-agency
cooperation and not by competition for congressional appropriations.
FTC and FCC cooperation will do much to allay the charge that
counter-advertising discriminates against the broadcast media. Admit-
tedly, the administrative imposition of a burden upon the electronic
media and not upon all mass media would be a form of discrimination.
The Supreme Court has consistently held, however, that such discrimi-
nation in the application of first amendment protections may be justi-
fied on the basis of differences between the broadcast and print media.150
Specifically, judicial approval of application of the fairness doctrine to
broadcast advertising will continue absent congressional repeal, regard-
less of the announcement -of administrative rules establishing a counter-
advertising format. Administrative attention has, however, also focused
on deficiencies in the other communications media. Designed to cor-
rect many genres of advertising abuses, the FTC's efforts to require
substantiation of advertising assertions 60 and to develop a viable system
of corrective advertising""' would affect all media.
Those advocating the correction of advertising abuses harbor no de-
sire to discriminate against radio and television. Nevertheless, since
groups with limited resources must select targets with care, the elec-
tronic medium has been chosen as one of several primary areas for re-
156. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1970).
157. The Communications Act permits an interested party to file a petition urging
the Commission to deny the renewal of an existing license. 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1)
(1970). The Act also allows any person, upon a showing of interest, to intervene in
an action. Id. § 309(e).
158. Liaison Statement, supra note 145.
159. E.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
160. 2 TADE REG. REP. 7573 (1974), reporting 36 Fed. Reg. 12058 (June 9, 1971), as
amended by 36 Fed. Reg. 14680 (July 7, 1971).
161. E.g., ITT Continental Baking Co. [1970-73 Transfer Binder] TADE REG. REP.
19,539 (FTC 1971). See Note, No, Virginia, Wonder Bread Doesn't Help Build
Strong Bodies Twelve Ways, 70 Mici. L. REv. 374 (1971).
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form because of its special characteristics. Many believe that the peculi-
arly persuasive impact and qualities of television render advertising
abuse in that medium particularly harmful.'62 Moreover, the Communi-
cations Act and its offspring, the fairness doctrine, provide an existing
remedy for correcting that abuse.6 3 The goal of counter-advertising is
to promote the availability of the information required for rational con-
sumer decisions and not to "get" television.'6 In due course more dif-
ficult problem areas in mass communications will receive attention un-
til that goal is realized. The FTC's new authority to seek preliminary
injunctions undoubtedly will aid that quest while minimizing any pos-
sible discrimination against the broadcast media.65
Economic Impact of Counter-Advertising
upon the Electronic Media
In addition to the alleged discrimination against the electronic media,
opponents of counter-advertising argue that restrictions on advertising
would undermine the economic structure of the broadcasting industry.
Accordingly, this economic impact must be defined and minimized by
the administrative framework selected to implement the FTC proposal.
Unfortunately, the FCC, while doing little to determine the financial
effect of counter-advertising, has asserted that the application of the
fairness doctrine to advertising would severely harm the economic base
of the industry. ""' Neither the Commission nor its supporters have ad-
vanced any persuasive data to substantiate these assertions.
Utilizing complete data from its licensees, the FCC could attempt to
predict the financial effect of counter-advertising by constructing an
economic model of the broadcasting industry., 7 Although the Commis-
sion does not presently have such data in a complete or usable form,
and probably will not obtain it until after the counter-advertising issue
162. See EcoNozxtc Aspvcrs, supra note 27, at 39-40.
163. See notes 34-113 supra & accompanying text.
164. See notes 206-23 infra & accompanying text.
165. Preliminary injunctions may be sought to correct abuses in all media. See note
151 supra.
166. Friends of the Earth, 24 F.C.C.2d 743, 748-49 (1970). An argument against in-
vocation of the fairness doctrine and based upon financial considerations was rejected
by the Supreme Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 US. 367 (1969). See
notes 78-79 supra & accompanying text.
167. See EcoNomuc AspEcTs, supra note 27, at 24. The Brookings Institution study
attempts to create a model which can be used to evaluate present policies. Although
some tentative extrapolation from the data is possible, the study does not provide the
kind of information necessary for examining the impact of counter-advertising.
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is resolved, efforts should now be begun to obtain the information.'"
An economic model would not only be essential in evaluating the initial
effect of counter-advertising on the broadcast industry but would also
be helpful in monitoring the impact of continued regulation.
The unsupported assertion that counter-advertising will destroy
broadcasting or gravely erode its quality fails to appreciate the nature
of the administrative process. One of the salutary characteristics of this
process is its ability to consider the economic impact of proposed pro-
cedures prior to their implementation and to monitor that impact after
regulations have been promulgated and while they are being enforced.
Initially, as previously suggested, the FCC could apply the fairness doc-
trine only to the more profitable licensees and impose lesser obligations
upon those with lesser resources. Such an approach would be consistent
with the standard enunciated by the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit in Citizens Comnunications Center v. FCC""0 to
be used in assessing license renewals, that court stating: "Along with
elimination of excessive and loud advertising and delivery of quality
programs, one test of superior service should certainly be whether and
to what extent the incumbent has reinvested the profit on his license to
the service of the viewing and listening public."'170 Surely one way for
a licensee to achieve the goals of eliminating "excessive and loud adver-
tising" and of reinvesting profit to serve the public would be to forego
initially some profit from advertising by providing free time to counter
the dubious advertisements that remain. 17
Pessimistic about the chances for success of an administrative imple-
mentation of a counter-advertising program and ignoring the results of
applying the fairness doctrine to cigarette advertising, opponents con-
clude that counter-advertising could generate significant financial losses
in the broadcast industry. 72 As already demonstrated, the obvious ad-
168. See 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-11 (1970), as amended by 44 U.S.C.A. §§ 3502, 3512 (Supp.
1974) (coordination of federal reporting services in gathering information).
169. 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cit. 1971). The court rejected the attempt of the FCC
to insulate incumbent licensees from comparative hearings with competing applicants.
170. Id. at 1213 n.15.
171. Manifestly, stations realizing little or no profit cannot serve the public by
eliminating advertising which they need to survive or by reinvesting profits that either
do not exist or are required to attract the capital necessary to operate a station. Such
capital, however, does not include the premiums paid to acquire the right to an FCC
license; nor does it include the limited real value of intangibles such as good will, the
Communications Act demonstrating that no property right exists in such acquired rights.
47 U.S.C. § 301 (1970). Although hoping for continuity, licensees invest such funds with
the full knowledge that policies of the FCC may change.
172. See Loevinger, supra note 2, at 9. Assuming that a blanket 20 percent of all
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ninistrative response to an economically threatening situation is a vari-
able application of new procedures dependent upon the profit margins
of licensees.173 Designed to assure reasonable minimum profits, a varia-
ble application would avoid the losses which opponents fear. It is by no
means clear, moreover, that a comprehensive counter-advertising pro-
gram would result in a diminution of broadcast advertising revenue.
The application of the fairness doctrine to cigarette advertising had a
minimal impact on revenues from such advertising. 74 Furthermore, the
experience with cigarette advertisements demonstrates that counter-ad-
vertising requires neither an exactly equal amount nor quality of reply
time but only that basic equality required for fairness.17 Such a time
limitation, coupled with the fact that some programming time can be
set aside for the discussion of advertising issues, further reduces the pos-
sibility of losses to licensees. In addition, counter-advertisements, since
they have a substantial public service aspect, could be presented during
the time presently allotted to some public service advertising having only
marginal value.
Although an administrative implementation of a counter-advertising
program would attempt to avoid losses to the broadcasting industry,
such losses could also be reduced by making adjustments in the adver-
tising market. A counter-advertising program might be especially at-
tractive to honest advertisers who calculate that advertising their prod-
ucts in the framework of full and relevant disclosure would increase
their sales. On the other hand, the program would be viewed with dis-
favor by nondisclosing advertisers who would cease to advertise alto-
gether because of a fear that a well-informed public would not buy their
products or who would avoid using nondisclosure advertising tactics to
prevent the disclosure of damaging information in counter-advertise-
ments. The likelihood that advertisers who could not withstand full dis-
advertising time would be required for counter-advertising, Justice Loevinger concludes
that television would lose $68 million, $18 million greater than its current pre-tax profits.
173. While often considered monolithic, the profitability of broadcasting varies con-
siderably. Television fares notably better than radio and is itself variable. Id. at 10-11.
Vital factors affecting profitability include market size, network affiliation, and whether
a station is VHF or UHF. Depending on market size, the most profitable stations are
those owned by the networks and the VHF stations. The UHF stations are the least
profitable. EcoNomic AsPEcrs, supra note 27, at 16-18.
174. See note 18 supra.
175. See Comment, And Now a Word Against Our Sponsor: Extending the FCC's
Fairness Doctrine to Advertising, 60 CALwF. L. REv. 1416, 1439-40 (1972), which discusses
the unsuccessful effort to achieve a one to five ratio of counter-advertising and cigarette
commercials. See also Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 16 F.C.C.2d 1034 (1969) and
National Broadcasting Co, 16 F.C.C.2d 884 (1969).
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closure would refrain from advertising does not necessarily mean that
licensees will suffer a loss of advertising revenues. Licensees will not ex-
perience financial setbacks if honest advertisers expand their efforts to
capture more of the market from those who would not or could not ad-
vertise honestly. 76 With the time available for advertisements declining,
a constant or increasing demand for broadcast advertisements would
result in an increase in the cost of advertising time. Consequently, the
advertising market would absorb much of the financial burden which
counter-advertising would place upon licensees.
Any consideration of the economic impact of counter-advertising
must include the possibility that part of the cost of reply time could be
borne by those desiring to refute the claims made in particular adver-
tisements. Since its 1949 statement, the FCC has used the fairness doc-
trine as the basis for affording responsible spokesmen the opportunity
to respond to controversial views presented by a licensee. 177 The con-
tinued application of this procedure would not only ensure the respecta-
bility of a counter-advertising program and the absence of nonsense and
diatribe but would also provide a probable source of broadcasting in-
come. For example, although charitable undertakings are chronically
short of money, responsible groups such as the American Heart As-
sociation should be able to pay something to licensees for broadcasting
their views.
176. An analysis of television advertising indicates:
From the standpoint of the individual advertiser . . . his demand for tele-
vision advertising ... is highly elastic .... At the same time, in television-
more than in any other medium-the value of advertising to the advertiser
is sensitive to the total amount and proportion of advertising in the medium.
This is true because an increase in the fraction of broadcast time devoted to
advertising reduces both viewerships and the attention viewers pay to a
given commercial.
EcoNo Mic AsPEcts, supra note 27, at 34. While extrapolation from this analysis of the
nature of television advertising is uncertain, several results are possible, including the
loss of revenue to broadcasting caused by counter-advertising. Given a reduction in
total advertising under such a program, honest advertisers would be willing to pay more
because they would attract more viewers and attention. The monopolistic character of
television advertising sales reinforces that possibility. Id. at 36-37. Already higher than
in other media, attention to television advertisements might increase under a counter-
advertising program because of greater availability of useful information and the
stimulation of conflicting claims between advertisers and counter-advertisers. Again,
such a program would increase both the public benefit and the willingness of advertisers
to pay the greater costs, since broadcasters would utilize their monopolistic power for
their own benefit.
177. Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). See also
Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of
Public Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598, 599 (1964).
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Beyond payments by counter-advertisers, comparative advertising
presents an avenue by which the goals of counter-advertising may be
achieved without a detrimental economic impact on the electronic me-
dia.18s The final FCC regulations should include comparative advertise-
ments within any counter-advertising quota. For example, the FCC
could classify as counter-advertisements statements by automobile in-
surance companies concerning the poor crashworthiness of automobiles
and indicating a willingness of their agents to identify particular makes
of automobiles which are superior or inferior. While the same approach
can be applied to comparative advertising among the various members
of a single industry, the FCC should critically examine such advertising
to ensure that it fulfills the counter-advertising goal of full disclosure.
Comparative advertising by the members of a particular industry pre-
sents special regulatory problems. Because radio and television advertise-
ments cannot be retained and collated, consumers might have difficulty
in evaluating a series of advertisements which emphasize various im-
portant aspects of a product. In addition, even competitors are likely
to ignore some of a product's negative characteristics.7 9 As a means of
dealing with these problems, the FCC could promulgate regulations
exempting from counter-advertising those industries which as a whole
present fully disclosing comparative advertisements. The specifics of
178. See Wall Street Journal, Dec. 26, 1973, at 1, col 1, describing the recent increase
in comparative advertising.
The following episode indicates, however, that the aversion of the broadcast industry
to counter-advertising may not be motivated entirely by economic considerations.
Believing that the major television networks are not presenting an accurate account of
the activities of the oil industry, the Mobil Oil Corporation has sought to buy time on
the networks to explain its position. The company also offered to pay for reply
advertisements to remove any arguments the networks might raise with respect to the
fairness doctrine. All networks refused the advertisements on the basis of a policy
against accepting advertising concerning controversial subjects, apparently without
regard to the economics of such refusals. An unidentified network executive, however,
admitted that the policy against controversy was violated in some oil company adver-
tisements because of difficulties in dealing with a "good customer." Although a network
vice-president recognized that the energy crisis presents a number of thorny questions
concerning the public interest, the question of the networks' fairness doctrines obliga-
tons remains unresolved. Brown, Networks Reject Mobil Equal Ad Plan, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 16, 1974, at 1, col. 2.
179. With no reason to camouflage the detrimental aspects of a product, producers
who deal with a totally distinct aspect possibly would focus upon the universally
ignored detriment and provide the public all pertinent information. Nevertheless, the
danger of self-motivated silence remains a problem. For example, because of the desire
of manufacturers to sell large automobiles, a substantial possibility exists that advertise-
ments of such products will ignore the adverse effect of automatic transmissions and
air conditioners upon gas mileage.
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such an exemption would depend upon the circumstances in individual
industries. °0 Using administrative regulations as a starting point, a valu-
able comparative advertising program would eventually grow out of
subsequent decisions, discussion, and rulemaking. If successful, such a
regulatory system would not only result in counter-advertising "paying
its own way" but would also assist in achieving the goals of a fully in-
formed public and an improved reputation for the business community.
An administrative policy designed to maintain the economic viability
of the broadcasting industry also would minimize any detrimental effect
on journalistic and program quality. Factors other than the impact of
counter-advertising are involved, however, in an evaluation of journal-
istic and program quality. Red Lion Broadcasting Ca. v. FCC""' dem-
onstrates that the FCC has the authority to compel the coverage of a
controversy and thereby assure the quality of broadcasting journalism.
Moreover, with respect to the issue of program quality in license re-
newal proceedings, it was held in Citizens Comnmnications Center v.
FCC 2 that the Commission must consider the nature and extent of a
licensee's reinvestment of resources, especially in cases involving highly
profitable stations.
A licensee realizing a return of 67 or 39 percent of its tangible in-
vestment can maintain program quality just as well as one making a 134
or 78 percent return.8 3 The only alternative is a comparative hearing
in which the licensee, facing an applicant perhaps better able to serve
the public interest, will risk the loss of its license. While broadcasters
have valid reason to expect a high return on their investments, the prof-
itability of an extremely significant portion of the television industry is
disproportionately high when compared to the industry-wide average
of approximately eight percent.184 These unusually high profit margins
could decline without serious detriment to the stations. Moreover, al-
though a high percentage of advertising revenue goes to producers, per-
180. Among a variety of questions, the FCC would have to determine the conse-
quences of one company choosing not to advertise comparatively or of an industry-wide
failure to present one possibly important issue. Those determinations would require
the agency to consider the size of the industry, the importance of the company to the
industry, the value of the ignored issue, the degree to which the advertisements develop
other issues, and any other possibly decisive factors.
181. 395 US. 367 (1969).
182. 447 F.2d 1201, 1213 n.35 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
183. EcoxoMic AsPECrs, supra note 27, at 17. These were the 1970 profit figures for
network-owned and VHF stations respectively.
184. Id. at 16.
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formers, and others associated with highly successful programs,' s5 these
individuals probably would accept lower remuneration to avoid "bank-
rupting" broadcasters or advertisers.
Many of the arguments concerning the economic impact of counter-
advertising are speculative and no more definitive than the assertion that
implementation of the FTC proposal would result in a substantial de-
cline in television advertising time. Such arguments demonstrate, never-
theless, that the proper course for implementing counter-advertising is
the administrative ideal of innovation and experimentation with appro-
priate adjustments based on experience. Rather than the destruction of
radio and television, the aim of the FTC and most advocates of counter-
advertising is the improvement of advertising quality. Safeguards, in-
cluding a well-balanced and articulated rule structure based upon and
checked by an economic model of the broadcasting industry, can and
should be developed to deal with the potential hazards of counter-ad-
vertising1s6 If this is done, the administrative implementation of a
counter-advertising program can maintain program quality while as-
suring the financial security of the broadcasting industry.
Improving the Quality of Advertising
While seeking to contain and minimize the economic disruption 'of
broadcasting, proponents of a rational counter-advertising mechanism
admittedly desire to change present advertising practices. Aimed at
achieving full disclosure in the context of a viable broadcasting system
supported by advertising, the FTC proposal undoubtedly will have a
major effect on the factual assertions in advertisements.1 7 Thus, an
examination of the character and magnitude of expected changes in
advertising is necessary in evaluating the merits of counter-advertising.
In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC' the Supreme Court provided
the legal foundation for the regulation of advertising by the FCC. Re-
sponding to the hypothetical assertion by broadcasting interests that ap-
plication of the fairness doctrine might drive controversy from the air,
the Court observed that if necessary the FCC could require the broad-
185. Id. at 41.
186. Unfortunately, the FCC appears disinterested in attempting to solve the problems
of providing a broadcasting service which is oriented toward the public interest. Indeed,
the agency seems more interested in establishing the impossibility of such a service.
A redirected disposition of the FCC would permit the utilization of the agency's con-
siderable resources in framing a realistic solution.
187. See Loevinger, supra note 2, at 14-16.
188. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
1974]
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casting of controversy.' Furthermore, since advertising lacks the first
amendment protection enjoyed by political speech, 190 the Commission
arguably could forbid nonfactual representations in broadcast adver-
tisements. While legally sound, the flaw in this reasoning is that ad-
vertisers, unlike FCC licensees, are neither under an obligation to serve
the public interest nor subject to sanctions for a failure to perform such
a duty. It is the advertisers, and not FCC licensees, who prepare adver-
tisements and thus determine the content of commercial messages. The
maximum deterrent which the FCC could direct toward broadcast ad-
vertising would be the requirement that the advertiser either disclose
relevant data fully or risk triggering the fairness doctrine.
The recognition of these practical limitations in forcing advertisers to
serve the public interest leads to a reconsideration of the objectives of
counter-advertising. The goal of full disclosure is an ideal which may
never be achieved, and an administrative counter-advertising program
should take this fact into account. The more important objective, nev-
ertheless, and one which should not be compromised, is that of protect-
ing consumers from the harm which may result from misleading and
partially disclosing advertisements. Giving priority to the latter goal,
although thereby perhaps reducing the quantum of information avail-
able to consumers, would be preferable for several reasons. Most im-
portantly, such an approach would ensure that consumers are protected
from the harm of misleading partial disclosures. Under a system in
which advertisers could not with impunity fail to mention the undesir-
able and perhaps hazardous effects of their products, partially disclosing
advertising would diminish, and any such advertisements which re-
mained would be deemed suspect by consumers. Eventually, the very
lack of information would provide consumers an incentive to seek in-
formation both to aid in making wise purchases and to rebut the pos-
sible inference that factual advertising was avoided because it would
be unfavorable. While these effects should result in a net improvement
in the overall quality of advertising, it must be conceded that a require-
ment that an advertiser disclose the bad as well as the good points about
its product will make more difficult the entry of new products into the
market.:""
189. Id. at 392-93.
190. See note 116 supra & accompanying text.
191. See Loevinger, supra note 2, at 17-18, where the problem of new product entry
is presented as a reason against the implementation of counter-advertising. Cf. EcoNo ic
AsiEeTs, supra note 27, at 37-39, which presents an argument that existing advertising
structures limit new entry.
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In addition to the major effect upon factual advertising claims,
counter-advertising would also change the nature of nonfactual assertions
made in advertisements. A mere urging of use or mention of name is
one of two major types of nonfactual advertising. Consumers will re-
gard such assertions as self-praise or an invitation to use a product with-
out any special claim concerning its virtues. Image advertising is the
second type of nonfactual advertising. As with the simple assertion that
a product is good, 92 viewers should perceive image advertising as no
more than self-praise; such a perception in itself is not overly harmful.
Although in most cases viewers and listeners will regard such advertis-
ing as noninformative, image advertising has the potential of creating
the attitude that the use of a product is essential or appropriate to the
"good life." Because of this potential, it will be necessary to apply the
second criterion of the FTC counter-advertising proposal to determine
the implications of such advertisements. 193
The cigarette advertisements in Banzhaf v. FCC'94 may be used to il-
lustrate both types of nonfactual advertising. The assertion "Smoke
Brand X because it is good" mentions the product's name and gives the
public the impression that some benefits will result from smoking this
particular brand of cigarettes. Because of the issues raised by such a non-
factual assertion, this and similar advertisements clearly touch upon the
realm of the fairness doctrine. Generally, it would appear that the scope
of permissible nonfactual advertising should be directly related to the
degree to which controversial issues are implicit in such advertising,
especially where those issues concern the ultimate use of a product.
Although attentive to implicit controversial issues, the FCC has at-
tempted to focus its advertising regulation upon explicit controversy;
the FTC proposal also has that focus. Consequently, unless it is similar
to the type of advertising in Banzhaf, an advertisement which urges
nothing more than consumption or asserts that a product is "good" us-
ually will not and should not be subject to the fairness doctrine. Adver-
tisements fall within the Banzhaf standards when disinterested third
parties determine that they affect an important interest in a significanly
adverse manner which is not commonly known. In most cases this de-
termination will be a governmental one, such as that made by the courts
and the FCC with respect to cigarette advertising. The American Heart
192. Such an assertion is mere puffng. See note 25 supra & accompanying text.
On the other hand, an allegation that a product is the best asserts a fact, since the
allegation lends itself to substantiation.
193. See note 8 supra & accompanying text.
194. 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cit. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
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Association, however, would be a proper party to bring the public's at-
tention the fact that a popular and highly regarded product contains an
ingredient which may adversely affect the health of millions of con-
sumers.
1 95
From the foregoing discussion it should be clear that an advertise-
ment urging enlistment in the army would not be subject to the fair-
ness doctrine simply because it omits discussion of a hazard which is
common knowledge.9'9  This difference in result emphasizes that there
are innumerable variations of nonfactual advertising, each implicitly
raising issues of greater or lesser importance. It would thus seem ap-
propriate to consider image advertisements on a case-by-case basis and
by balancing the factors considered in the Banzhaf decision: the im-
portance of the adverse effect, the intensity of that effect, the knowl-
edge of the public concerning that effect, and the reliability of the
source which asserts the adverse effect.'9
7
The FCC can weigh the same factors in analyzing factual assertions
in advertisements. An evaluation of factual claims should include an ex-
amination of the relative merits of the facts provided, a consideration of
the possible application of the counter-advertising rules, and suggestions
of ways to achieve conformity with those rules. Such an analysis may
be illustrated by considering examples of advertisements for a hypo-
thetical soft drink and toothpaste:
Drink Burpo!
Burpo tastes good.
Burpo makes you feel good.
Burpo has vitamin C.
Burpo has lots of vitamin C.
Burpo with vitamin C is good for you.9 s
Glop toothpaste gives you 14 brushes to the ounce.
Glop toothpaste is the most economical toothpaste.
195. One such case is milk, a product that is widely promoted by image advertising.
While its adverse effects have been suspected for a long time and are now rather
certain, milk retains a substantially unchallenged position because the industry has
great political power. Theoretically, milk is precisely the type of product about which
the public interest standard and the fairness doctrine should require information;
nevertheless, the public is virtually uninformed about those adverse effects. See generally
California Milk Producers Advisory Bd, No. - (F.T.C., filed April 22, 1974).
196. See Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1971). But see note 105 supra & ac-
companying text questioning this result.
197. Compare Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
842 (1969), 'with Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
198. Loevinger, supra note 2, at 15.
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Glop toothpaste gives more brushes to the ounce than any other
toothpaste.
Glop toothpaste gives five more brushes to the ounce than any
other toothpaste1 99
It has been argued that advertisements with the most factual content
are the most likely to trigger counter-advertising.200 The error in this
contention lies in its failure to acknowledge the substantive difference
between advertisements making general factual assertions and those pre-
senting specific allegations. The former would invoke reply because of
their tendency toward incompleteness, but the latter would do so only
if the veracity or completeness of the particular statement was chal-
lenged. Thus, the hypothetical toothpaste advertisement is unlikely to
trigger counter-advertising because it provides information which is
useful to a potential purchaser and is specifically verifiable. The first
assertion can be easily tested, and the other three can be verified when
the product is compared with others. The advertisement would avoid
the first three criteria of the counter-advertising proposal if all the as-
sertions are true and the fourth if the product has no undisclosed detri-
mental characteristics. 2 1
The Burpo advertisement, on the other hand, probably would trigger
reply advertising because it provides only 'one general fact and consid-
erable opinion. Such an excess of opinion could easily be remedied by
the advertiser. Rather than "lots of" vitamin C, the advertisement could
state what percentage of the average daily requirement as determined
by the United States government is contained in an eight ounce serv-
ing. Moreover, while not legally required, the advertisement could com-
pare the vitamin content of the drink with that of orange juice.2 2 The
199. E. KrrcH & H. PRLAN, LEGAL REGLATiON OF THE CODaYPEn PROCESs 97
(1972).
200. Loevinger, supra note 2, at 15.
201. See notes 7-10 supra & accompanying text. Glop might be particularly abrasive
or Burpo might have a large amount of sugar. The failure to disclose such negative
aspects in the advertisements may raise issues of public concern, especially if the adver-
tisements are directed specifically toward naive audiences and children. Special rules
probably would be required for advertisements focused toward children. Since the
FCC is considering this problem apart from the question of applying the fairness
doctrine to advertising, it is not considered in detail here. Although requiring full
disclosure is one way to deal with advertisements for children, the preferable course
of action is a complete ban on advertising aimed at children of products that might
harm them. The parent rather than the child should decide whether Burpo is to be
consumed despite its high sugar content.
202. The FTC has rejected such a mandatory basis of comparison. Cf. Coca-Cola
Inc., [1970-73 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 19,351 (FTC 1971).
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same approach would eliminate the "it's good for you" opinion. The
advertisement could state, for example, that the drink is good for a per-
son because it provides a certain percentage of the average daily re-
quirement of vitamin C.203
Either directly or indirectly, a counter-advertising program would
force the advertiser to disclose more than the mere fact that Burpo
has vitamin C.204 Advertisers who claim vitamin C content but fail to
specify the amount would generate suspicion in an advertising atmos-
phere where most advertisements present such statistics. In such a milieu
it is expected that purchasers would penalize the nondisclosing adver-
tiser by not purchasing its product. 05 In addition, a counter-advertising
program could remedy the nondisclosure directly by forcing disclosure
of the vitamin C amount or prohibiting any assertions concerning the
product's vitamin content.
The FTC counter-advertising proposal does not create a structure
which is a certain guide in every situation. Nevertheless, the proposal
presents a clear, abstract statement of a legal principle which was easily
applied to these hypothetical advertisements. Built upon that founda-
tion, two things will occur in time. The abstract principle itself will be
refined as a result of administrative inquiry, scholarly comment, and
case decisions. Moreover, the abstraction will become more certain in
.application after it has been used to correct the deficiencies in particular
advertisements. Eventually, businessmen will know what is permitted
and not permitted. Accordingly, they will improve the quality of their
advertisements in order to avoid counter-advertising, other legal sanc-
tions, and, most importantly, the loss of sales.
The Politics of Advertising
Because of the nature of American concepts of government, it is only
natural that the political process play a substantial role in implementing
the counter-advertising proposal. In the early nineteenth century,
203. The assertion regarding the percentage of the average daily requirement is not
controversial in any sense of the FTC proposal. See notes 7-10 supra.
204. The question of Vitamin C content would be either controversial under the first
or second criteria of the FTC proposal or scientifically questionable under the third
criterion. See notes 7-9 supra & accompanying text.
205. Of course, good products may glut a market area and create a problem for some
of them. Burpo may be only one of 80 soft drinks which all have more vitamin C per
serving than orange juice. In such a situation, consumers presumably would base
purchases on flavor, bottle shape, and other subjective factors which can be advertised
without regard to counter-advertising.
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De Tocqueville observed the unusual attraction of Americans to using
the judiciary to solve social and political problems.206 Although that
tendency has remained strong,0 7 the failure of the judiciary as a vehicle
for reform was a major impetus for the creation of the modern admin-
istrative structure and agencies such as the FCC and FTC.208 From the
beginning, the purpose of the "fourth branch of government" was to
serve as the forum for the resolution of complex social and political
problems. 20 9 While some people regard as wrong the American attitude
toward judicial and administrative involvement in political issues, that
attitude exists, is sanctioned by history, and will remain a potent force
and important aspect of American society.
Opponents of counter-advertising argue that judicial and adminis-
trative involvement in advertising will do little to improve the public's
impression of business or quiet the "vigorous attacks . . .mounted
against advertising. 21 0 Those opponents do not cavil with the validity
of the public's attitude but assert that the attacks increase as the quality
of advertising improves. They fail to consider the possibility that such
improvement flows from increased governmental regulation resulting
from organized consumer pressure.21'
206. A. DE TocQuEvrLLE, DEMOCRACY IN Ammc& 72-77 (Mentor ed. 1956).
207. Compare Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (Negro citizenship), 'with
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1908) (minimum hours) and Brown v. Board of
Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1954) (school racial segregation) and Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion). For an in-depth exploration of the interrelations in con-
stitutional litigation in the twentieth century, see W. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTIT TrION
IN THE TwENTIETH CENTURY (1969).
208. K. DAvis, ADmimIsmATrv LAW § 105 (1965).
209. Id.
210. Loevinger, supra note 2, at 2.
211. The recent application of the fairness doctrine to cigarette advertising, followed
by the total ban of such advertising, may be compared to a consumer effort to publicize
the dangers of cigarette smoking more than two decades ago. The manufacturer of
Old Gold cigarettes advertised that its product had been found to be the least irritating
of the six leading brands in terms of tar and nicotine content in an "impartial test by
Reader's Digest." Indeed, the magazine had conducted a test, but the conclusion it
reached, as quoted by the court in P. LorilIard Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1950),
was that "no single brand is so superior to its competitors as to justify its selection on
the ground that it is less harmful." The court, noting that the assertions contained
in the Old Gold advertisements were but a small part of the whole truth, upheld a
finding of the FTC that such advertisements were misleading. Obviously underestimating
the abilities of the advertising copy writer, the magazine article had observed: "The
laboratory's general conclusion will be sad news for the advertising copy writers, but
good news for the smoker, who need no longer worry as to which cigarette can most
effectively nail down his coffin. For one nail is just as good as another" Id. at 57.
Recently, Senator Frank B. Moss and the American Public Health Association pre-
sented a petition to the Federal Consumer Product Safety Commission. Hopefully,
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The middle years of the last decade witnessed a coalescing of factors
which bear heavily upon the thesis that the effort to promote fairness
in advertising is political. First, a remarkable man named Banzhaf was
able to convince the FCC that the fairness doctrine should be applied
to cigarette advertising.212 Shortly thereafter, the civil rights movement
discovered that the doctrine could be used as a means of combating rac-
ism in broadcasting.213 First analyzing the fairness doctrine as a first
amendment imperative,24 Dean Jerome Barron then developed his
theory of a right of access to the media, a theory which has provided a
compelling basis for using the doctrine as a broad instrument of social
reform. 15 Moreover, Ralph Nader and others launched the contempo-
rary consumer movement which questioned the safety of products and
the basic ethics of the corporate community. Finally, the reaction to the
Vietnam war created a new, multi-faceted movement supported by a
mass of intelligent and articulate people who believe that reform should
be effected within the framework of existing institutions.21 Naturally
allied with the consumer group, the new reformers view the fairness
doctrine as the means for improving the quality of broadcasting.
these are the type of responsible parties who would use consumer protection pro-
cedures. But cf. Loevinger, supra note 2, at 21-22. The petition sought the ban of
27 brands of cigarettes because of high tar content, a decisive health hazard in cigarettes,
but disregarded nicotine content because of its unclear effect upon health. Gold,
Petition to Seek a Cigarette Curb, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1974, at 13, col. 1. Interestingly,
whatever may have happened to Old Gold's advertising policy, both Old Gold 100's
and Old Gold Straights made the list of brands the ban of which was requested. The
petition stated that the product is among "the most dangerous varieties of cigarettes."
Id. Moreover, the modem descendants of the five brands which Old Gold bested are
also included on the petition, a result which provides little support for Justice Loevinger's
optimism.
212. WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381 (1967), afi'd sub nom. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082
(D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
213. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C.
Cir. 1969).
214. Barron, In Defense of "Fairness": A First Amendment Rationale for Broadcasting's
"Fairness" Doctrine, 37 U. COLO. L. REv. 31 (1964).
215. J. BARRON, FREF.DM OF THE PRSS FOR WHOM? (1973); Barron, Access to the
Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 H v. L. REv. 1641 (1967). See Collins,
Positing a Right of Access: Evaluations and Subsequent Developments, 15 Vm. & MARY
L. REV. 339 (1973), commenting on the access theory.
216. The McCarthy, Kennedy, and McGovern campaigns provide the best examples
of mass movements seeking to reform society. Among other examples, former Secretary
of Health, Education and Welfare John Gardner organized Common Cause and former
Attorney General Ramsey Clark and former Associate Justice Arthur Goldberg are
deeply involved in public interest work. These men and others rely heavily upon large
numbers of committed people throughout the country.
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Although many have advocated fundamental changes of various as-
pects of American society, reformers have nonetheless sought to main-
tain a media without governmental domination.217 In an effort to pro-
vide access to the people and a greater dissemination of ideas, the at-
tempt has been made to use a governmental application of legal rules as
a countervailing force to the private interests which control the broad-
casting industry. That effort may be quixotic, futile, or wrong, but the
underlying motives decidedly are not totalitarian. Moreover, the influ-
ence of licensees, full disclosure by competing advertisers, and the na-
ture of the democratic process should prevent the control of a counter-
advertising program by totalitarian forces.
The licensees themselves provide an assurance against the seizure of
the reply right by small militant factions or groups with entrenched
governmental power. Under the fairness doctrine, licensees have the
duty to act in good faith to assure fair discussion of controversial issues
of public importance. Since licensees control the choice of respond-
ents18 and thus will determine initially who may present counter-ad-
vertisements, it is unlikely that they will select irresponsible spokesmen.
The major burden of response to cigarette advertising, for example,
fell upon the American Cancer Society and the American Heart Associ-
ation. While some people undoubtedly would have liked to argue that
consumption of marijuana is no more hazardous than that of tobacco and
thus proper, the licensee would have been under no obligation to accept
such an advertisement and probably would not have done so. Because
the fairness doctrine mandates fairness in covering an issue and not com-
plete access for every view,219 it is difficult to conceive reversal by the
FCC or a court of a licensee's decision not to broadcast an arguably ir-
responsible advertisement.
Presented by either the advertiser or competitors, full disclosure
stands as another check against counter-advertising abuses. Presumably,
disclosing advertisers will offer products that consumers consider su-
perior and will have unhampered access to broadcasting time. Honest
advertisers with superior products will benefit because they can ad-
vertise and present complete facts. On the other hand, economic detri-
ment will be suffered by honest advertisers with inferior products who
must either refrain from advertising or disclose their products' short-
217. E.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 US. 665 (1972).
218. Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
219. Id.
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comings' 2° and by nondisclosing advertisers whose obfuscative efforts
will be negated by informative counter-advertisements.
The access of advertisers, the advertising industry, and the broad-
casting industry to the democratic process should also provide a meas-
ure of protection against abuse. In the adoption of a counter-advertis-
ing program, all three can argue for reasonable standards designed to
promote dialogue rather than diatribe. Their effort should begin with
the initial rulemaldng proceedings, continue with a critique of the short-
comings in the adopted rules, and end with litigation to reverse errone-
ous decisions by the licensee or the FCC. Because these groups are ar-
ticulate, intelligent, well funded, and have a reasonable access to the
media, they can readily and ably protect their interests within the con-
text of democratic procedures. Moreover, American history demon-
strates that vocal militant groups ultimately are unsuccessful,2'1 and
there is no reason to believe that the result will be different with
counter-advertising.
The significant fact about the American political scene which op-
ponents of counter-advertising fail to acknowledge is that the new re-
form movement is largely composed of intelligent and rational indi-
viduals and that only a small portion of its support emanates from the
"lunatic fringe." Indeed, members not only of the wealthier and poorer
segments of society but also of the vast middle and upper-middle
classes have become intensely concerned with the quality of life in this
220. Substantially all cigarette advertising vanished from its pages when the New
York Times required that cigarette advertisements disclose the tar and nicotine content.
Upon fulfilling that standard, some cigarette advertising subsequently returned.
221. Consider this comment about the Declaration of Independence:
Our democracy then, in Jefferson's familiar but neglected phrase, rests
on a "decent respect to the opinions of mankind."
The Declaration of Independence was motivated by, among other things,
American feelings of anger and outrage against King George III and the
members of his government. Yet it did not attack the king as an idiot or
lunatic. Nor did it scream curses or identify the king with unsavory or
unmentionable physical or sexual acts. It did not even accuse George III
or his government of corruption and incompetence, which it might very
well have done. The declaration simply declared some rights and some
grievances in measured, even legalistic language. If the Declaration of
Independence had been a volcano of expletives, it would have had little
effect in its day and would have been buried with other sub-literature long
before our time. Much of our daily problem of communication arises
from our unwillingness to show a similar decency and self-restraint.
D. BOORSMIN, DEMOCRACY AND ITs DiscoNTENTs: RFxLEcnoNs ON EVERYDAY AxmEm.rsu 7
(1971). The history of such contemporary organizations as the Black Panthers and
Students for a Democratic Society demonstrates that if radical, intemperate groups gain
a forum, they will harm themselves more than those they attack.
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country. Paradoxically, establishment organizations seeking to improve
society raise questions that are uncomfortable for entrenched economic
interests. For instance, the American Heart Association has questioned
the healthfulness of what is now deemed to be "normal" amounts of
whole milk, eggs, and animal protein in adult diets. Moreover, the
American Cancer Society has attacked the use of tobacco, while the
American Tuberculosis Association has turned its attention to other
respiratory ailments and protests against air pollution. Middle class citi-
zens of Santa Barbara, California oppose further off-shore drilling for
oil in their locality and impliedly in most other areas. In moves that
would have shocked a socialist ten years ago, automobile insurance
companies support no-fault insurance to the chagrin of trial attorneys,
question the crashworthiness of automobiles to the discomfort of the
automobile industry, and literally shout about the problem of drunken
driving to the possible displeasure of the liquor industry. 21
Entrenched economic interests could tolerate such criticisms if they
were voiced by groups which are virtually powerless. American busi-
ness has little reason to fear food cultists inspired by oriental religions,
advocates of marijuana or narcotics consumption urging them as
sources of enlightenment, wandering beachcombers irritated about the
spoilage of their refuge by the effluents of modem industry, or even
a respected group such as the Amish holding unusual ideas about mod-
em conveniences and contemporary society. Those impotent factions
would not have moved the FTC to propose counter-advertising regula-
tions to the FCC. The FTC and FCC listen, however, when the people
involved are dedicated scientists, respected philanthropists, hard-work-
ing business people, articulate and able attorneys, and others similarly
situated. From the perspective of the affected industries, the resultant
political change presages economic danger because the ability of estab-
lishment organizations to effect reform is much greater than that of
small, vociferous, militant groups. Thus, the opposition to a counter-
advertising program stems from a belief in the absolute necessity of
checking those people who know how to make the system responsive
and from an absence of a full understanding of the potential benefits
of such a program for honest businessmen.23
222. It must be noted that the liquor industry has been an outspoken opponent of
liquor abuse.
223. Even though one may disagree with his conclusion about political motivation,
most of Justice Loevinger's observations concerning the governmental bureaucracy are
correct. Although the leadership of the FTC in 1972 was devoted to realistic change,
a desire to enhance its power, prestige, and influence perhaps may motivate the FTC
19741
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
CONCLUSION
The nature of the administrative process provides the essential mech-
anism for overcoming the practical difficulties in implementing a
counter-advertising program. Guided by the basic administrative quali-
ties of flexibility and experimentation, the FTC and FCC can create,
develop, and refine a scheme which can avoid the detrimental political
and economic effects which opponents fear Will result from the imple-
mentation of the FTC proposal. Continued licensee participation in
communications regulation and resort to the democratic process
throughout the development of the program can channel political in-
volvement toward furtherance of the public interest. Although the al-
leged economic impact of counter-advertising would be insubstantial,
the administrative process can determine and minimize that impact by
initially requiring only the most profitable stations to run counter-ad-
vertisements.
Undoubtedly, a counter-advertising program will affect the nature
of the advertisements presented by the mass media. Advertisers either
will become honest and disclosing or have their partial disclosures re-
butted and clarified by replies; in either instance, the result will provide
the public more accurate and complete information for making rational
purchasing decisions, a primary goal of the private, free enterprise sys-
tem.
The fairness doctrine provides a firm theoretical basis for an ad-
ministrative counter-advertising program. The decided cases demon-
strate that the principle is generally applicable to advertising and that
the first amendment provides no specific constitutional bar to a further
extension of the doctrine to the entire field of advertising. Although the
FCC and the courts have limited the application of the doctrine to the
facts of particular cases, the necessity now exists for comprehensive
regulation to guide the actions of advertisers and the broadcasting in-
dustry. Administrative development of a counter-advertising program
can provide that certainty and thereby further the vital objectives of
informed consumer decisions and an improved reputation for business.
in counter-advertising. See Loevinger, rupra note 2, at 18-21. Individuals representing
the public before the FTC and the FCC, nevertheless, understand how to deal with
these institutions and how to respond to their detracting attributes. Always able to
draw applications which the FCC will find acceptable, the Washington communications
bar has understood those institutions especially well for a long time. See, e.g., Preison,
The Need for Modification of Section 326, 18 FED. Com. B.J. 15 (1963), where the
author, a leader of the communications bar, candidly presents some of the realities of
FCC practice and ultimately argues that the FCC should not consider or control program
content. Undoubtedly, the communications bar also would be effective in protecting
the interests of the broadcasting industry were counter-advertising rules adopted.
